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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-4-103(2)G) of the Utah
Code and this court's January 25, 2016 order.
Introduction

The district court dismissed Build Inc.' s claim for additional compensation
from UDOT for work Build performed on what the parties call the Arcadia
project. The claim for additional compensation hinges upon whether the UDOT
engineer believed he was ordering Build to perform work beyond what the
contract called for when he ordered Build to haul excavated material off site.
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment on this claim before Judge
Kennedy, which Judge Kennedy denied when he recognized that there is
disputed evidence concerning whether the UDOT engineer believed he was
ordering extra work. After Judge Harris inherited the case, and well after the
dispositive motion deadline had passed, UDOT filed a motion styled as a motion
for clarification, but that in substance was a renewed motion for summary
judgment. Judge Harris granted the motion, even though the same evidence
revealed the same disputed issue of material fact.
UDOT also filed a motion to exclude certain evidence of Build' s
consequential damages that it incurred as a result of the breach of contract. Judge
Harris excluded from trial the testimony of two witnesses about lost profits. But
Judge Harris then dismissed Build's claim for consequential damages, even

1
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though there is other evidence of consequential damages in the record and no
motion to dismiss that claim was before the court. Under these circumstances, if
the dismissal of a claim- instead of the exclusion of evidence to support a
claim-is appropriate, then there must be a timely motion for summary
judgment or a motion for directed verdict before the court. Here, UDOT did not
file a dispositive motion on consequential damages, so the court lacked authority
to dismiss the claim after excluding certain evidence. In fact, this court recently
disapproved of this precise practice. Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, ,r 14
n.11, 263 P.3d 440.
This court should reverse the district court's order dismissing Build' s
claims for additional compensation stemming from the Arcadia project and
Build' s claim for consequential damages.

2
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Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether under the coordinate judge rule a second judge can

reverse the first judge's denial of a dispositive motion and dismiss a party's
claims, where the motions before the second judge were not motions to
reconsider and were filed well after the dispositive motion deadline.
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 13721.
Standard of Review: This court reviews for correctness a district court

judge's decision to overrule a prior judge's denial of summary judgment. AMS
Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997).

Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in dismissing a claim for

consequential damages where no dispositive motion was before the court and
there was some evidence of consequential damages in the record.
Preservation: The evidence of consequential damages was preserved at
R. 7173, and the dismissal issue arose for the first time at R. 15782-83.

Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews for correctness a district

court's decision to enter summary judgment. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61,

,r 10, 221 P.3d 219.
Determinative Provisions

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal.
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Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

1.

This case arises out of Build' s work on three different UDOT construction
projects: the Legacy project, the Arcadia project, and the 1-215 project. (R. 195201.) Build was the general contractor on the Arcadia and I 215 projects, and it
was a subcontractor for Clyde-Geneva Constructors on the Legacy project.

(R. 195, 199, 200.) Build experienced problems with all three projects and filed
claims against UDOT and Clyde-Geneva. (R. 194, 204-15.) Build claimed that
UDOT breached its contracts and sought consequential damages. (R. 194-215.)
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment on Build' s claims related to
the Arcadia project, and a motion for partial summary judgment on Build' s
consequential damages claim.1 (R. 753, 1279.) Judge Kennedy denied the motion
on the ground that Build had provided sufficient admissible evidence to support
both claims. (R. 9837-39.) After the dispositive motion deadline had passed and
the case was reassigned to Judge Harris, UDOT filed a motion in limine to
exclude certain evidence of consequential damages and a motion for clarification
regarding Judge Kennedy's denial of summary judgment on Build's breach of
contract claim. (R. 10323.) Judge Harris granted both motions and dismissed both
claims. (R. 15781-85.)

UDOT filed motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment
on all of Build' s claims, but only the motions concerning the Arcadia project and
consequential damages are relevant to this appeal. (R. 750, 1279, 1534, 1772.)
1

4
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Build filed a petition for permission to appeal from Judge Harris' s
interlocutory order, and this court granted the petition. (12/15/15 Pet.; 1/25/16
Order.)
2.

Statement of Facts

This appeal concerns Build's claims (i) for consequential damages resulting
from UDOT's failure to compensate Build in connection with all three projects,
and (ii) for UDOT' s breach of contract on the Arcadia project.
2.1

Build's Consequential Damages

Build's claim for consequential damages arises out of UDOT's failure to
compensate Build for its work on all three projects. On the I-215 project, Build
alleged that it completed the work described in the contract, but UDOT delayed
payment. (R. 200.) On the Legacy and Arcadia projects, Build alleged that UDOT
asked Build to complete additional work- beyond the scope of the contractsand that UDOT failed to compensate Build for the additional work. (R. 197-99,
201.) As a result of UDOT' s failures to pay Build, Build lost capital and cash flow.

(R. 201-03, 3637.) Because Build lost capital and cash flow, Build lost its bonding
capacity, and UDOT reduced the amount of work that Build was allowed to bid
on. (R. 3637.) UDOT's breaches, along with Build's mounting litigation expenses
in this case, caused Build' s eventual demise. (R. 3594, 7173, 7249, 7251-52, 727374.)

Build filed a claim against UDOT, alleging business devastation. (R. 194,
439.) Build sought consequential damages for its lost profits. (R. 199, 201-14, 439.)
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Build stated that its total damages were still being calculated, but would exceed
$5 million. (R. 439, 15363.)
In support of its consequential damages claim, Build retained Joan
Whitacre to provide an expert opinion on the effect of UDOT' s failure to pay
Build. (R. 3610, 10327.) Ms. Whitacre provided an analysis of Build "as an ongoing business" and concluded that Build had been financially healthy prior to
its work with UDOT. (R. 3609-19, 10324, 10332.) She concluded that "[t]he
tipping point that sent [Build] into an umecoverable financial situation" was
UDOT's failure to pay. (R. 3619.)
Build also stated in its initial disclosures that Build' s president, Freddie
Stromness, had personal knowledge concerning the business devastation claim.
(R. 15362.) UDOT took the deposition of Mr. Stromness in July of 2013.

(R. 12975.) The deposition lasted two days. (R. 12975.) Mr. Stromness testified
that Build' s business devastation claim was based upon Ms. Whitacre' s report.
(R. 15364.) Neither UDOT nor Clyde-Geneva asked Mr. Stromness whether he
had an opinion regarding Build' s value or Build' s lost profits. (R. 12975.) At the
end of the two-day deposition, Clyde-Geneva asked for the opportunity to
question Mr. Stromness. (R. 12975.) Build made the accommodation even though
fact discovery had closed. (R. 12976.)
Mr. Stromness's second deposition was held in August 2014-more than a
year after his first deposition. (R. 12976.) At the beginning of the deposition,
Build's counsel stated that, because the second deposition was a continuation of
the first, it would be inappropriate to question Mr. Stromness about any issues

6
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that had arisen after his original deposition concluded the previous year.

(R. 12976.) Consistent with that position, Build' s counsel objected to those
questions and instructed Mr. Strornness not to answer. (R. 12976, 16275-77.)
2.2

UDOT's Breaches of Contract on the Arcadia Project

Although Build suffered consequential damages from UDOT' s breaches on
all three projects, the details of only the Arcadia project are relevant to this
appeal.
The Arcadia project involved the replacement of a bridge and the
reconstruction of a highway on either side of the bridge. (R. 854.) The project
required a significant amount of excavation. (R. 854.) The plan contemplated that
the excavated clay would be disposed of within the limits of the Arcadia project
boundaries as "fill." (R. 854.) The contract did not contain any line item or cost
for disposing of excavated clay beyond the project site. (R. 855.) Instead, the plan
provided as fallows:
Fill slopes may be £la ttened as shown on plans in order
to waste excess material. Fill slopes may be placed up to
a 10:1 slope with the new toe of slope at least 10 feet
from proposed [right of way] line.

(R. 854, 3114, 3117, attached at Add. C.) The contract also detailed how much fill
could be stored at particular locations within the project site. (R. 1331, attached at
Add. D.)
But as Build began the excavation, UDOT's resident engineer, Rex
Harrison, learned of "subsurface movement" -a landslide-in the area where
the material was to be placed. (R. 3503, 3511-12, attached at Add. E.) UDOT
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completed a change order indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an
unstable historic land slide" and detailing the "corrective action" taken to
"improve its stability per Geotechnical Engineers['] recommendations." (R. 7743,
attached at Add. F.)
Mr. Harrison determined that there was not enough room for the
excavated material to be disposed of on the fill slopes. (R. 856, 3511-12.)

Mr. Harrison instructed Build to haul the clay offsite. (R. 201, 3511-12.) Build
followed Mr. Harrison's instructions, but the additional work resulted in
additional costs of $389,000. (R. 201, 857, 859.)
Build sought compensation from UDOT for the additional work. (R. 201.)
UDOT denied Build' s request, and Build alleged that UDOT' s denial constituted
a breach of contract. (R. 209-10, 858, 3530.)
Two provisions of the contract are relevant to Build' s claim. Both
provisions govern situations where UDOT requires Build to complete additional
work. The difference between the provisions is whether it is UDOT or instead
Build who first recognizes that the work is beyond the scope of the contract.
The first, part 1.6, applies if UDOT intentionally changes the project.

(R. 2428, attached at Add. B.) It is titled "Significant Changes in the Character of
Work." (R. 2428.) Part 1.6 allows UDOT to order Build to complete additional
work, but it requires UDOT to notify Build of the additional work in writing.

(R. 2428.)
The second provision, part 1.5, applies if UDOT orders work that Build
believes is beyond the scope of the contract, something the contract refers to as
8
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an "alleged change[]." (R. 2427.) Part 1.5 is titled "Differing Site Conditions,
Changes and Extra Work." (R. 2427.) It requires that, if Build believes UDOT has
ordered additional work, Build will "[p]romptly notify the [e]ngineer in writing
of alleged changes to the [c]ontract ... within five calendar days of the date the
change or action was noted." (R. 2427.)
Notably, Mr. Harrison testified that Build followed the correct procedure
in attempting to obtain additional compensation for its additional work. (R. 350910.)
2.3

Judge Kennedy Denies UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment

After discovery closed, UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment on
Build's breach of contract claim concerning the Arcadia project. (R. 1279.) UDOT
argued that hauling the excavated clay offsite was not additional work because
the contract contemplated that the excavated clay would not be placed on the
project site. (R. 1285, 1296-97.) UDOT also argued that Build's claim was barred
because Build failed to provide written notice of the "alleged change" as
~

required by part 1.5 of the contract. (R. 1293.) UDOT argued that it denied
Build's claim because Mr. Harrison "felt there was no validity to Build's claim"
because the contract "specifically states" that Build will dispose of excess
material. (R. 7707.)
In support, UDOT presented evidence that a Build representative testified
that he knew Build would be required to haul the excess clay offsite. (R. 1287,
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1289.) UDOT also presented evidence that "Build felt it was Build's responsibility
to haul the material" and that Build waited more than a year to provide written
notice of its claim. (R. 1289.)

In opposing the motion, Build argued that, because Rex Harrison had
notice of the additional work, UDOT waived the notice provision under part 1.5
of the contract. (R. 3465-66.) Build also argued that, because Mr. Harrison did not
order the work "in writing" as required by part 1.6 of the contract, UDOT
breached the contract. (R. 3470.)
In support, Build presented evidence that the contract required the
excavated clay to be disposed of within the project boundaries, and that

Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering additional work. (R. 3456-57.)
Specifically, Build presented evidence that Mr. Harrison testified that he
"exercise[d] engineering judgment" when he decided to order Build to haul the
excess clay offsite. (R. 3456, 2812-13.) Thus, hauling the clay offsite was a result of

Mr. Harrison's judgment, not the contract. (R. 3463.) Build also presented

• ...

evidence that Mr. Harrison later acknowledged, in writing, that a "change

[w]as the basis of [Build's] claim in that [excavated material] could no longer be
effectively disposed of within the contract limits." (R. 3456-57, 3530, attached at
Add. G.)
Judge Kennedy denied UDOT's motion. (R. 9837.) Judge Kennedy ruled
that Build's claims "are subject to questions of fact, including whether UDOT

10
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breached its contract with [Build], whether UDOT waived the notice provision
and whether [Build' s] claims satisfy the requirements of the Changed Conditions
Clause of the contract specifications." (R. 9837.)
2.4

The Case is Assigned to Judge Harris After the Dispositive Motion
Deadline Passes

Judge Kennedy retired shortly after he denied UDOT' s motion for
summary judgment. (R. 10158.) After his retirement, the case was assigned to
Judge Harris. (Docket at 2/13/15.) The deadline for dispositive motions passed
on January 31, 2014-more than a year before Judge Harris was assigned to the
case. (R. 270.)
2.5

Judge Harris Overhtrns Judge Kennedy's Summary Judgment
Ruling

On July 23, 2015, UDOT filed a motion seeking to reverse Judge Kennedy's
summary judgment ruling. (R. 11622-38.) UDOT captioned its motion as a
"Motion for Clarification on Legal Issues Not Yet Addressed or Ruled Upon."

(R. 11622.) UDOT filed a similar motion addressing Judge Kennedy's ruling on
~

Build's claims concerning the Legacy project. (R. 10157.)
In the motion, UDOT claimed that Judge Kennedy's ruling "d[id] not
address or rule upon" Build's claims concerning Arcadia and "d[id] not identify
with any specificity the material facts Judge Kennedy ruled were at issue."

(R. 11623.) UDOT's motion purported to seek "clarification," not dismissal of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law11
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Build's claims. (R. 11622, 11637.) UDOT asserted that its motion was neither a
motion for summary judgment nor a motion to reconsider. (R. 14666, 14670.)
UDOT repeated the arguments it had made in its summary judgment
motion before Judge Kennedy. UDOT argued that hauling the excavated clay
offsite was not additional work because the contract contemplated that the
excavated clay would not be placed on the project site. (R. 11626-28.) UDOT also
argued that Build's claim was barred because Build failed to provide UDOT
written notice of the "alleged change" as required by part 1.5 of the contract.

(R. 11628-34.) UDOT noted that "[t]he proper analysis in this case ... is to
examine whether Rex Harrison believed the alleged extra work actually
constituted extra work under the contract." (R. 14674.)
UDOT cited additional evidence -not cited in its summary judgment
motion-that Mr. Harrison believed his orders were consistent with the contract.

(R. 11627-28.) Specifically, UDOT pointed to Mr. Harrison's testimony that he
"did not consider Build's hauling of the extra material ... to constitute [a] change
involving extra work" and that "[t]he intent was not to dispose of all the excess
materials within the limits of the project boundaries." (R. 11627.)
Build argued that Judge Harris should deny UDOT' s motion because
Judge Kennedy had already ruled upon UDOT's arguments. (R. 13695, 13721.)
Build argued that, in effect, UDOT' s motion was a motion for summary
judgment filed well after the dispositive motion deadline. (R. 13721-22.)

12
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Build again pointed to the evidence that the contract required the
excavated clay to be disposed of within the project boundaries, that Mr. Harrison
testified that he used his "engineering judgment" when he ordered Build to haul
it offsite, and that Mr. Harrison later acknowledged, in writing, that a "change[]

... [w]as the basis of [Build's] claim in that [excavated material] could no longer
be effectively disposed of within the contract limits." (R. 13713, 13716, 13718.)
Build also cited evidence-not cited in its summary judgment motion-that
Mr. Harrison testified that "the contractor was allowed to dispose of excavated

material in waste areas" within the project site. (R. 13714 (citing R. 3504).)
Judge Harris dismissed Build' s claim. (R. 15784-85.) Judge Harris ruled
that under section 1.5 of the contract, Build was required to provide notice of an
"alleged change" if Mr. Harrison did not believe he had ordered additional
work (R. 15784-85 (citing Meadow Valley Contractors v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35,266
P.3d 671).)

Judge Harris concluded that "[h]ere, UDOT provides evidence indicating
that Rex Harrison, the resident engineer, did not believe that the direction to
Build to haul waste material offsite was a change to Build's scope of work Build
has provided no evidence to the contrary." (R. 15785.) Of course, Build had
provided evidence to the contrary, just as it had in opposing the original motion
for summary judgment.
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In response to UDOT's other "motion for clarification" - addressing Judge
Kennedy's rulings on the Legacy project-Judge Harris explained that the court
"takes [it] as a motion to reconsider," and "conclude[ed] that reconsideration of
its prior order is necessary." (R. 15778.) Judge Harris made no similar comments
in his discussion of Build's "motion for clarification" on Build's claims
concerning the Arcadia project. (R. 15784-85.)
2.6

Judge Harris Dismisses Build's Consequential Damages Claim

UDOT also filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Ms. Whitacre and
Mr. Stromness. (R. 10323.) UDOT argued that neither witness should be allowed

to testify about Build' s value or its lost profits. (R. 10334.) UDOT argued that
Ms. Whitacre should not be allowed to testify because she did not opine about
the amount of Build' s damages in her expert report as required under rule
26(a)(3). (R. 10341.) And UDOT argued that Mr. Stromness should not be allowed
to testify about the amount of damages because Build failed to provide a
calculation of its business devastation damages as required under rule 26(a)(l).

(R. 10337-38.) UDOT asked that the testimony of both witnesses be excluded as a
sanction under rule 37. (R. 10337-38, 10341-42.) UDOT's motion sought the
exclusion of the testimony, not the dismissal of Build' s consequential damages
claim. (R. 10342.)
In opposing the motion, Build argued that Mr. Stromness should be able to
testify because Build had provided to UDOT all of the documents Build relied on
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to support its consequential damages claim. (R. 12964.) Build also argued that
Ms. Whitacre should be allowed to testify because her report described both the
fact and causes of Build's damages. (R. 12968.)
Judge Harris agreed with UDOT. He ruled that Ms. Whitacre could not
testify as to the amount of damages because she did not quantify consequential
damages in her report. (R. 15781.) He ruled that Mr. Stromness could not testify
as a sanction under rule 37(£) both because Build had failed to provide a
computation of its consequential damages in violation of rule 26(a)(l)(c) and
because Build had instructed Mr. Strornness not to answer questions about
Build's consequential damages at his second deposition in violation of rule
30(c)(2). (R. 15782.)
The court then dismissed Build' s consequential damages claim. (R.1578283.) The court ruled that because Mr. Stromness was Build' s sole witness on its
consequential damages claim, and Mr. Stromness's testimony was now excluded,
Build' s consequential damages claim "fails for lack of proof." (R. 15782.)
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Summary of the Argument

Judge Harris dismissed Build' s contract claims concerning the Arcadia
project and Build' s claim for consequential damages even though UDOT did not
file a dispositive motion and even though Judge Kennedy had previously denied
UDOT' s dispositive motions directed at those claims. UDOT instead filed a
motion for clarification and motion in limine. UDOT did not cite Rule 56 or
otherwise comply with the requirements for moving for summary judgment.
UDOT repeatedly insisted that it was not asking Judge Harris to reconsider
Judge Kennedy's prior ruling. In this procedural posture, Judge Harris erred in
dismissing Build' s claims.
Judge Harris also erred because the same disputed issues of material fact
identified by Judge Kennedy remained when Judge Harris dismissed the claims.
Build' s claims concerning the Arcidia project hinge upon whether the UDOT
engineer believed he was ordering Build to perform work outside the contract.
Build provided evidence that the UDOT engineer had that belief, making
summary judgment inappropriate on those claims. And Build' s claim for
consequential damages should not have been dismissed because there remained
a category of consequential damages - attorney fees- in play, and because Build
must put on its case at trial, after which dismissal may be appropriate only if
Build provides no evidence of consequential damages. This court should reverse
the dismissal of both claims so Build can present its case at trial.

16
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Argument

Judge Harris erred, both procedurally and substantively, when he
dismissed Build' s claims for breach of contract and consequential damages.
1.

Judge Harris Erred When He Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of
UDOT and, in Effect, Reversed Judge Kennedy's Ruling

Judge Harris erred in three ways when he entered summary judgment in
favor of UDOT on Build' s breach of contract claim concerrung the Arcadia
project-two procedural and one substantive. First, he granted what was in
essence a summary judgment motion filed beyond the dispositive motions
deadline, a motion Judge Kennedy already had denied. Second, he violated the
coordinate judge rule when he reversed Judge Kennedy's ruling. Third, he either
ignored or gave little weight to Build' s evidence- evidence that, properly
considered, created a disputed issue of fact, just as Judge Kennedy recognized.
But before explaining how Judge Harris erred, it is important to
understand the extent to which Judge Harris' s ruling reversed Judge Kennedy's
prior ruling. Comparing the arguments UDOT made in its initial motion for
summary judgment with the arguments UDOT made in its subsequent "motion
for clarification" and the rulings in the orders resolving those arguments
confirms that Judge Harris ruled upon - and reversed - issues previously ruled
upon by Judge Kennedy.
Before Judge Kennedy, the relevant questions were (i) whether hauling the
excavated clay was additional work beyond the scope of the contract, and (ii) if it
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was additional work, whether Build' s claim was nonetheless barred because
Build failed to provide notice of the alleged change. (R. 1285, 1293, 1296-97.)
The parties presented conflicting evidence. Build presented evidence that
(i) the contract required the excavated clay to be disposed of within the project
boundaries, and (ii) Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering additional
work. (R. 3456-57.) UDOT presented evidence that (i) the work was not beyond
the scope of the contract and (ii) Mr. Harrison agreed. (R. 7707.)
Judge Kennedy ruled that there were disputed issues of material fact
concerning (i) whether the work was beyond the scope of the contract and

(ii) whether the notice provision applied-Le., whether Mr. Harrison knew that
he was ordering additional work. (R. 9837.)
Before Judge Harris, the issue presented was whether Build' s claim was
barred because Build failed to provide notice of the alleged change. (R. 11630-34.)
That issue turned upon whether Build had an obligation to provide notice, which
in turn turned upon whether UDOT understood that it was ordering additional
work. As UDOT put it, "[t]he proper analysis in this case ... is to examine
whether Rex Harrison believed the alleged extra work actually constituted extra
work under the contract." (R. 14674.) Thus, the issue presented to Judge Harris
was the same as the issue presented to Judge Kennedy.
The parties again presented the conflicting evidence. Build presented
evidence that (i) the contract required the excavated clay to be disposed of within
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the project boundaries, and (ii) Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering
additional work. (R. 13713, 13716, 13718, 13714 (citing R.3504).) UDOT presented
evidence that (i) the work was not beyond the scope of the cont.Tact and

(ii) Mr. Harrison understood that and agreed. (R. 11626-28, 14674.)
Judge Harris ruled that there was not a factual dispute and Build' s claims
were barred because Build failed to comply with the notice provisions.

(R. 15785.) Judge Harris ruled that "UDOT provides evidence indicating that Rex
Harrison, the resident engineer, did not believe that the direction to Build to haul
waste material offsite was a change to Build' s scope of work. Build has provided
no evidence to the contrary." (R. 15785.) Of course, while UDOT did provide
such evidence, Build had provided evidence to the contrary, just as it had in
opposing the original motion for summary judgment.
1.1

Judge Harris Granted an Untimely Dispositive Motion and Ruled
Upon Issues that Judge Kennedy Had Already Decided

UDOT captioned its motion as a "Motion for Ruling and Clarification on
Legal Issues Not Yet Addressed or Ruled Upon." (R. 11622.) This motion could
function either as a motion for summary judgment,2 asking the court to rule on
UDOT's arguments in the first instance, or as a motion for reconsideration,
asking the court to reverse Judge Kennedy's prior ruling. The substance of the

Even though UDOT' s motion functioned as a motion for summary
judgment, it did not comply with the requirements of rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. This failure is another reason Judge Harris erred in granting
the motion.
2
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motion-and of Judge Harris's ruling on the motion-shows that it functions as a
motion for summary judgment. But the motion was filed on July 23, 2015, well
after the January 31, 2014 deadline for dispositive motions. (R. 270, 11637.) Utah

R. Civ. P. 56(b) (motion for summary judgment must be filed by deadline
ordered by the court). Judge Harris therefore erred in considering, let alone
granting, UDOT' s motion for summary judgment, however it was captioned. 3
The substance of UDOT' s motion reveals that it is a motion for summary
judgment, which explains why it led to the dismissal of Build' s claim. UDOT
asked Judge Harris to consider the waiver issue in the first instance. (R. 1163034.) Specifically, UDOT asked Judge Harris to decide whether Build's claims are

barred because Build failed to give notice that it was being asked to perform
extra work beyond what its contract required. (R. 14667.)
UDOT asserted in its motion papers that "Judge Kennedy d[id] not
address or rule upon" UDOT' s arguments concerning the extra work and notice
provision. (R. 11623, 11630-34.) Indeed, UDOT cited and responded to arguments
Build made in its opposition to UDOT' s initial summary judgment motion.
(R. 11633-34 (citing "Build's Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary

Judgment regarding Arcadia").)

UDOT insisted in its reply that UDOT "is not requesting summary
judgment." (R.14666.) But this court has held that "the substance, not caption, of
a motion is dispositive in determining the character of the motion." Trembly v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Kunzler v. O'Dell,
855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
3
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Judge Harris's order confirms that he construed UDOT's motion to be a
motion for summary judgment. He recites the arguments UDOT made in its
initial summary judgment motion, 11 grants th[e] motion," and II dismisse[s]"
Build's claims. (R. 15784-85.)
But while Judge Harris dismissed Build' s claim when he entered summary
judgment, it is unclear which of UDOT' s motions he granted in entering
summary judgment. It could have been either UDOT' s initial summary judgment
motion that Judge Kennedy had denied or UDOT' s second "Motion for
Clarification" filed after the dispositive motion deadline. Either way, Judge
Harris erred.
If Judge Harris was addressing UDOT' s first motion, he erred because that

motion was not before him-Judge Kennedy already denied it. (R. 9837.) Judge
Kennedy's ruling denies UDOT' s motion even if UDOT believes that Judge
Kennedy did not address all of UDOT' s arguments. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d
1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) (a ruling on a motion "implicitly and necessarily
constitute[s] an adverse ruling" on arguments not expressly addressed in ruling).
If Judge Harris instead was addressing UDOT' s second motion, he erred

because the motion was filed more than a year after the deadline for dispositive
motions and does not comply with rules 7 and 56. (R. 270.) Thus, regardless of
which motion Judge Harris was considering, he erred when he considered
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UDOT' s motion to be, in substance, a dispositive motion and entered summary
judgment against Build.4
This court recently disapproved of precisely this practice. In Fisher v.

Davidhizar, after the trial court had denied a motion for summary judgment on a
fraud claim, the defendant filed a motion in limine, a motion designed to
determine which evidence can be presented at trial. 2011 UT App 270, ,r,r 4-5, 263
P.3d 440. But the court treated the motion in limine as a dispositive motion,
ruling that the plaintiff "could not prevail because he could not prove his fraud
claims by clear and convincing evidence." Id.

,r 5.

This court faulted the district court for granting what was, in effect, an
untimely summary judgment motion that repeated arguments on which the
court had already ruled. This court held that, "although styled as a motion in
limine, [the plaintiff's] last minute motion was in substance a motion to dismiss
made long after the motion cut-off date had passed." Id.

,r 14 n.11. "It seems what

the trial court did ... was revisit its summary judgment ruling. However, the
trial court appears not to have relied on the facts from the summary judgment
filings .... If the trial court was revisiting its previous denial of summary
judgment on the fraud claims, it erred in considering contradictory evidence and

In its reply, UDOT for the first time asserted that it was a "Rule 56(d)
Motion" and cited authority. (R.14658, 14666, 14670.) But even ignoring the fact
that UDOT' s assertion came too late, rule 56(d) solves nothing. Rule 56(d)
allowed the court to "ascertain" and "specify[]" what material facts exist in
adjudicating a motion for partial summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(d)
(2011). It did not provide an alternate basis to dismiss a party's claims.
4
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making a credibility determination." Id. Because the record contained disputed
issues of material fact, this court held that the district court was correct in its
initial decision to deny summary judgment. Id.

,r,r 15-16.

The same is true of UDOT' s second motion. This court should reverse
Judge Harris's ruling and reinstate Judge Kennedy's denial of summary
judgment so Build can have the opportunity to prove its claims at trial.
UDOT's motion was not a motion to reconsider - It is worth noting that,

to the extent UDOT disagreed with Judge Kennedy's ruling, UDOT could-and
should- have filed a motion to reconsider, if it could have overcome the
coordinate judge rule. A judge remains free to reconsider his own prior decisions
"at any time before the entry" of final judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Indeed,
prior to the entry of final judgment, a 54(b) motion to reconsider is the
appropriate way to request that a judge reverse his own summary judgment
ruling. Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184-85; Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc.,
761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
But a judge's authority to revise his prior rulings is not without limit.
Judges can abuse their discretion in reconsidering prior rulings. Timm v.
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). This court has held that "a litigant

seeking revision and reversal" of a summary judgment ruling II must demonstrate
a reason for the request." U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ,r 58,
990 P.2d 945 (emphasis added). This court has articulated a list of such reasons:
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(1) the matter is presented in a" different light" or under
"different circumstances;" (2) there has been a change in
the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence;
(4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does not
reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct
its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed
when first contemplated by the court.

Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Edward A. Reott, 2011 UT App 152, ,r 9, 263 P.3d 391
(internal quotation marks omitted). The list is not exhaustive. Id. But absent one
such factor, a court abuses its discretion when it reverses a prior summary
judgment ruling. Id.
Here, UDOT's motion was not styled as, nor was it in substance, a motion
to reconsider. Indeed, UDOT insisted in its reply that "this motion is not a
Motion for Reconsideration" and that UDOT "is not ... moving the Court to
reconsider summary judgment." (R. 14666, 14670.) Similarly, at the hearing
before Judge Harris, UDOT's counsel explained that "we're not asking the Court
to overrule Judge Kennedy." (R. 16136.)
The substance of the motion confirms UDOT' s claim. UDOT does not cite
rule 54(b) or request that Judge Harris reverse Judge Kennedy's ruling. UDOT
does not acknowledge-let alone identify an error-in Judge Kennedy's decision
that there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the waiver issue.
(R. 11630-33.)
Similarly, Judge Harris's order confirms that he did not treat UDOT's
motion as a motion for reconsideration. Although Judge Harris expressly stated
that he treated UDOT's "Motion for Clarification" on the Legacy project as if it
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were a motion to reconsider, he did not do so for UDOT' s motion for clarification
with regard to the Arcadia project, which is at issue here. (R. 15778, 15784-85.)
The order does not mention rule 54(b). (R. 15784-85.) The order does not
acknowledge that Judge Kennedy denied UDOT' s motion for summary
judgment, let alone identify an error in that ruling. (R. 15784-85.) Nor does it cite
any factor that would provide the court an appropriate reason to reconsider
Judge Kennedy's ruling. (R. 15784-85.)
1.2

Judge Harris Violated the Coordinate Judge Rule

Even if UDOT' s motion had been a motion to reconsider, Judge Harris' s
order would still be improper because it violates the coordinate judge rule.
Under the coordinate judge rule, "one district court judge cannot overrule
another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938,
947 (Utah 1987). The rule is a branch of the law of the case doctrine, and it has
11

evolved to avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is

presented with an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon by
~

a coordinate judge in the same case." Id. at 946-47.
Utah courts have recognized three exceptions to the rule. The first occurs
when "relevant circumstances change in the intervening period," such as a
II

change in the governing law." State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989).
The second exception occurs when "the issues decided by the first judge are
presented to the second judge in a different light," such as "where a summary
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judgment initially denied is subsequently granted after additional evidence is
adduced." AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319
(Utah 1997).
The third exception occurs when, "although the factual and legal posture
of the case has not changed, it appears to the second judge that the first ruling
was clearly erroneous and will infect the subsequent proceedings with error."

Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ,r 5, 996 P.2d 540. Thus, under the
coordinate judge rule, "[i]t is not that the second judge lacks power to revisit an
earlier judge's rulings. Rather, there are circumstances where that power should
not be exercised." 5 Id.

,r 4.

The rule is long-standing. It has repeatedly been reaffirmed by this court
and the supreme court, as recently as May 2016. USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp,
2016 UT 20, ,r,r 37-39, _

P.3d _ ; Red Flame, 2000 UT 22,

,r 4; Archuleta v.

Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ,r 34 n.3, 267 P.3d 232; AMS, 942 P.2d at 319; Lamper, 779 P.2d
at 1129; Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 908-09 (Utah 1989); Mascaro,
741 P.2d at 946-47; Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735,736
(Utah 1984); Bd. of Educ. of Granite School District v. Salt Lake Cnty., 659 P.2d 1030,
1033 (Utah 1983); Richardson v. Grand Cent. Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977);
Build argued that Judge Harris should deny UDOT' s motion because the
motion violated the coordinate judge rule. (R.13721-23.) At the hearing, Judge
Harris asked Build's counsel whether Judge Harris had discretion to consider the
issues that Judge Kennedy had already ruled upon. (R.16135.) Consistent with
Red Flame, Build's counsel explained that the court had discretion to consider the
issues, but that the court "should not exercise it." (R.16135-36.)
5
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Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973); Wood v. Lewis,
No. 20060429-CA, 2006 WL 2089976, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. July 28, 2006); Jenkins v.

Payne, No. 20000956-CA, 2002 WL 724589, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2002);
State v. Ellis, 969 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Schoney v. Mem'l Estates,
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.,
Inc., 739 P.2d 634,636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Here, Judge Harris violated the coordinate judge rule to the extent he
overruled Judge Kennedy's summary judgment ruling. As discussed above, the
issue before Judge Harris was the same as the issue Judge Kennedy had already
resolved-whether there was evidence that Mr. Harrison understood that
ordering Build to haul the excavated material offsite constituted work beyond
the scope of the contract. (R. 7707, 14674.) Judge Kennedy ruled that there were
disputed issues of material fact on that issue, and Judge Harris ruled that there
were none. (R. 9837,15785.)
No exception to the rule applies. Below, UDOT argued that the third
exception applied- that an error in Judge Kennedy's ruling "will infect the trial."
(R. 14670.) Indeed, Judge Harris noted that UDOT's argument was that .(/there's
been an error made that would infect the proceedings." (R. 16134.) But neither
UDOT nor Judge Harris identified any error. Instead, aside from UDOT' s single
use of the word" error," UDOT maintained its position that Judge Kennedy had
not ruled upon the issues in UDOT's brief. (E.g., R.14666.)
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The other two exceptions also do not apply. There has been no change in
the law governing Build' s claims or UDOT' s defenses, nor did UDOT claim that
there had been any. Lamper, 779 P.2d at 1129. (See R.11622-37.) And UDOT did
II

not present the issue to Judge Harris in a different light." AMS, 942 P.2d at 319.
There was no evidence before Judge Harris that resolved the factual dispute
identified by Judge Kennedy. (R. 9837, 15785.) Although both parties presented
additional evidence before Judge Harris, the evidence served to reinforce-not
resolve-the dispute.
II

UDOT' s additional evidence was Mr. Harrison's testimony that he did
not consider Build' s hauling of the extra material ... to constitute [a] change
11

involving extra work" and that [t]he mtent was not to dispose of all the excess
materials within the limits of the project boundaries." (R. 11627.) Build's
additional evidence was Mr. Harrison's testimony that "the contractor was
allowed to dispose of excavated material in waste areas" withm the project site.
(R. 13714 (citing R. 3504).) Thus, the issue was presented to Judge Harris in
precisely the same light as it had been presented to Judge Kennedy. The
exception does not apply. Under the coordinate judge rule, Judge Harris erred
when he reversed Judge Kennedy's ruling.
To be clear, there have been opinions from this court and from the Utah
Supreme Court holding that a judge has discretion to reconsider the decision of a
coequal judge. Under these opinions, the three exceptions are turned on their
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heads-they are no longer exceptions to the rule prohibiting reconsideration, but
instances where the second judge must reconsider the first judge's ruling. E.g.,

Mid-Am. Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ,r,r 11-15, 216 P.3d 352; IHC
Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,r,r 25-28, 196 P.3d 588. But
these opinions do not render Judge Harris' s ruling proper.
First, UDOT did not argue that these opinions overruled the coordinate
judge rule. (R. 14670.) Indeed, in response to Build's argument that Judge Harris
was bound by the coordinate judge rule, UDOT agreed, arguing only that its
motion "does not violate the coordinate judges rule" because the motion "falls
under one of the exceptions." (R. 14668 (capitalization omitted).)
UDOT cited IHC, but only in response to Build's argument that UDOT's
motion was untimely. (R. 14670-72.) Specifically, UDOT argued that, because
under IHC a court may reconsider a prior decision, "a Motion for
Reconsideration would still be timely if filed at the present time." (R. 14671-72.)
UDOT did not argue that IHC had any bearing on the coordinate judge rule
analysis. Thus, to the extent UDOT would now argue that the coordinate judge
rule is inapplicable, the argument would be raised for the first time on appeal.
Regardless, the cases do not acknowledge, let alone overrule, the line of
cases upholding the coordinate judge rule. The coordinate judge rule remains
good law. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the rule in May of 2016,
noting that "the doctrine prevents the second judge from overruling the first,"
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II

unless an exception such as the different light" exception applies. USA Power,
2016 UT 20, ,r 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that
"[m]ere citation of additional authority alone is insufficient to warrant revisiting
a decided issue, at least where the cited authority does not modify the
fundamental theory of the motion." Id.

,r 39 n.29 (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted) (citing Sittner, 692 P.2d at 736).
The coordinate judge rule therefore precluded Judge Harris from revisiting
and reversing Judge Kennedy's ruling. He erred when he violated the rule.
1.3

Judge Harris Ignored or Weighed Disputed Evidence

Even if the coordinate judge rule did not prevent Judge Harris from
reconsidering Judge Kennedy's ruling, and even if Judge Harris had in fact
reconsidered Judge Kennedy's ruling, Judge Harris's order was still erroneous.
Judge Harris erred when he concluded that there were no disputed issues of
material fact concerning whether Build waived its claim for compensation for the
extra work by failing to provide written notice to UDOT as required by part 1.5
of the contract.
The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue in Meadow Valley
Contractors, Inc. v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35, ,r,r 26-33, 266 P.3d 671. In that case, a

contractor entered into a contract with UDOT to do paving work. Id.

,r 3. The

contractor believed that the contract permitted ribbon paving, a less expensive
paving method. Id. UDOT disagreed and required the contractor to use block
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paving, a more expensive method. Id.

,r 7. After completing the block paving, the

contractor sought compensation for the additional expenses. Id.

,r 26. The

contractor claimed that UDOT changed the contract when it required block
paving. Id.

,r 9.

The contract contained the same two notice provisions at issue here. Id.

,r,r 28-29. UDOT argued-like it does here-that the contractor waived its claim
for additional compensation when it failed to provide to UDOT written notice of
II

the alleged change." Id.

,r,r 26, 31.

The court held that the question turned upon whether UDOT made a
"knowing and deliberate change" to the project. Id.

,r 32. If so, the contractor was

not required to provide notice under the contract. Id. The court held that, "[t]o
determine whether the ribbon-paving ban was a 'knowing and deliberate'
change or an 'alleged change' turns on whether [the UDOT engineer] believed
that the ban altered the contract." Id.

,r 32.

The same is true here. Judge Harris recognized that the question turned
upon whether Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering extra work.
(R. 15785.) He acknowledged that, under Meadow Valley, written notice of the
alleged change was required "so long as the resident engineer who directed the
work did not believe that the work was outside of the scope of work specified in
the contract." (R. 15785.)
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But Judge Harris ruled that Build "provided no evidence" indicating that
Mr. Harrison believed he ordered additional work. (R. 15785 (emphasis added).)
Judge Harris ruled as follows:
Here, UDOT provides evidence indicating that Rex
Harrison, the resident engineer, did not believe that the
direction to Build to haul waste material offsite was a
change to Build' s scope of work. Build has provided no
evidence to the contrary, and in fact, the evidence
demonstrates that for nearly one year after the work
was performed, Build believed that the work was
within the scope of its contract. Therefore, because
Build failed to provide written notice as required by its
contract with UDOT, its claim for breach of contract is
DISMISSED.
(R. 15785.)
But in fact, Build provided several pieces of evidence indicating that
Mr. Harrison understood that hauling the excavated clay was work outside the
scope of the contract, and that Mr. Harrison ordered the extra work after learning
that the material could not be stored onsite because of a landslide.
Specifically, the following evidence was before the court:
• Language in the contract indicating that "[£]ill slopes may be
flattened as shown on plans in order to waste excess
material." (R. 1285, 3114, 3117 (Add. C).)
• Language in the contract indicating how much excavated
material would be disposed of at various locations within the
project site. (R. 1331 (Add. D).)
• Mr. Harrison's testimony that "the contractor was allowed to
dispose of excavated material in waste areas" within the
project site. (R. 13714, 3504 (Add. E).)
• A change order, completed by UDOT during the project,
indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an
32
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unstable historic land slide" and detailing the "corrective
action" taken to "improve its stability per Geotechnical
Engineers['] recommendations." (R. 7743 (Add. F).)
• Mr. Harrison's testimony that he mstructed Build to haul the
excess clay offsite based upon an exercise of his "personal
engineering judgment, along with our geotechnical
recommendations" after becoming "aware of subsurface
movement in that particular slide area." (R. 3456, 3511-12
(Add. E).)
•

A letter from Mr. Harrison, acknowledging that a
"change[]". . . [w] as the basis of [Build' s] claim in that
[excavated material] could no longer be effectively disposed
of within the contract limits." (R. 3456-57, 3530 (Add. G.)

Judge Harris was required to consider all of Build's evidence. On a motion
to reconsider a summary judgment ruling, the court must consider all of the
evidence cited in the original motion papers. Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882
P.2d 650, 654-55 (Utah 1994). The court has discretion in deciding whether to
consider evidence cited in the motion to reconsider. Id. & n.8.
Here, Judge Harris recognized that he was required to consider the
evidence cited in the summary judgment papers that were filed before Judge
Kennedy. (R. 16126 (referring to courtesy copies of the original summary
judgment papers).) And he exercised his discretion to consider the evidence cited
in the subsequent motion papers. Indeed, Judge Harris based his decision upon
UDOT's "evidence indicating that Rex Harrison ... did not believe that the
direction to Build to haul waste material offsite was a change to Build' s scope of
work." (R. 15785.) UDOT cited this evidence only in its "motion to clarify," not in
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its initial summary judgment motion. (R. 11627; 1284-91.) Thus, Judge Harris was
required to consider all of the evidence Build submitted.
It is unclear whether Judge Harris failed to consider Build's evidence or
whether he instead weighed the disputed evidence and determined that UDOT' s
evidence was more credible. Either way, Judge Harris erred.
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that, l'/[o]n a motion for summary
judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry
should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo,
888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). "It is not the purpose of the summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the
weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled
against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, as Judge Kennedy ruled, Build's claims were "subject to questions of
fact." (R. 9837.) Based upon Build's evidence, a jury could conclude that
Mr. Harrison believed that he ordered additional work. Thus, Judge Harris erred

when he weighed or ignored Build' s evidence.
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2.

Judge Harris Erred When He Dismissed Build's Consequential Damages
Claim

Judge Harris also erred when he dismissed Build's consequential damages
claim, on his own, "for lack of proof," after ruling that neither Ms. Whitacre nor
Mr. Stromness could testify about Build's value or its lost profits. (R. 15782-83.)
Not only did Judge Harris lack authority to dismiss the claim for lack of proof,
the claim in fact did not lack proof.
UDOT filed a motion to exclude the testimony of both witnesses, not to
dismiss claims. (R. 10323.) UDOT argued that Build violated rule 26, and that

exclusion was the appropriate sanction under rule 37. (R. 10337-38, 10341-42.)
Specifically, UDOT argued that Ms. Whitacre should not be allowed to testify
because she did not opine about the amount of damages in her expert report as
required under rule 26(a)(3). (R. 10341.) Similarly, UDOT argued that
Mr. Stromness should not be allowed to testify because Build failed to provide a
calculation of its business devastation damages as required under rule 26(a)(1).

(R. 10337-38.) UDOT sought the exclusion of testimony, not the dismissal of
~

Build' s consequential damages claim. (R. 10342.)
Judge Harris agreed with UDOT. (R. 15781-82.) Judge Harris ruled that
neither witness would be allowed to testify about the amount of Build's
consequential damages. (R. 15781-82.) But Judge Harris did not stop there. After
granting UDOT's motion to exclude the testimony, Judge Harris dismissed
Build' s claim, ruling that it "fails for lack of proof":
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Furthermore, Build admitted at the hearing on this
motion that it intends to rely on Fred Stromness as its
sole witness on its consequential damages claim.
Because Fred Stromness' s testimony is excluded, Build' s
claim for "Consequential Damages from Concurrent
Conduct" stated on pages 8 through 10 of its Amended
Complaint fails for lack of proof, and is DISMISSED.
(R. 15782-83.)
The dismissal is erroneous for two reasons. First, Judge Harris lacked
authority to dismiss Build's claim for the reason he articulated. Judge Harris's
ruling functioned as a ruling on an unfiled motion for summary judgment. In
effect, he ruled that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
[UDOT] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" on Build' s consequential
damages claim. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). But a court may not dismiss a claim on its
own summary judgment motion. Id.; Clifford P.D. Redekop Family LLC v. Utah

Cnty. Real Estate, 2016 UT App 121, ,r 8, _

P.3d. _

(example of a district court

properly granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment after excluding
the only testimony on point).
Judge Harris had authority to dismiss Build' s claim in other circumstances.
Rule 41(b) allows a court to dismiss a claim on its own motion, but not "for lack
of proof." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41 allows a court to dismiss a claim only
"[£]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with the[] rules" of civil
procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b); PDC Consulting, Inc. v. Porter, 2008 UT App 372,

,r 14, 196 P.3d 626. Here, although Judge Harris ruled that Build violated the
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rules of civil procedure, the violations were not the basis of his dismissal.
(R. 15782.) Rule 41 therefore does not authorize the dismissal.
Alternatively, if UDOT believed that Build lacked evidence of
consequential damages, UDOT could-and should-have filed a motion for
directed verdict at the close of Build' s evidence at trial. E.g., Cerritos Trucking Co.
v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). The dismissal would occur

only after Build had an opportunity to present its evidence, though, not before.
Second, and more important, the testimony of Mr. Stromness and
Ms. Whitacre was not the only evidence Build had to support its consequential
damages claim. 6 The exclusion of certain evidence does not demonstrate that no
other evidence could be presented at trial. Even with the exclusion of the
testimony, Build's claims did not "lack ... proof." (R.15782.)
Indeed, as UDOT itself noted below, Build's litigation expenses were "the
culprit" in Build's cash flow problems. (R. 7172-73.) Kevin Nilsen replaced
Mr. Stromness as president and CEO of Build and testified that Build's cash flow
"diminished because of the litigation with UDOT. It sucked over half a million
dollars of cash out of the company .... When you go from having close to a

6 Judge

Harris is incorrect that "Build admitted at the hearing on th[e] motion
that it intends to rely on Fred Stromness as its sole witness on its consequential
damages claim." (R.15782.) At the hearing, Build admitted that Mr. Stromness
would testify concerning Build's business devastation claim, which constitutes
only a part of its consequential damages claim. (R.16273-74.) Specifically, Build
stated that Mr. Stromness would be its witness "regarding the value of Build and
its profitability," or as Judge Harris put it, "[£]or the number." (R.16273-74.)
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million dollars in the bank account and that cash flow gets sucked out by legal
fees, it can pretty much devastate a company." (R. 7249, 7251-52, 7243-74.)
These expenses are consequential damages. Utah law allows a party to
recover litigation expenses as consequential damages arising from a breach of
II

contract when the defendant's breach of contract foreseeably caused the
plaintiff to incur attorney fees through litigation with a third party." Collier v.

Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 983-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline
Equip., L.L.C., 2006 UT App 446,

,r,r 21-22, 147 P.3d 951. The rule is sometimes

called the "third-party tort rule." Lewiston, 2006 UT App 446, ,r 22 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Build sued Clyde-Geneva, the general contractor, as a result of
UDOT's breaches of contract on the Legacy project. (R. 195-99.) In other words,
UDOT's breach of contract caused Build to incur attorney fees through litigation
with Clyde-Geneva. Under the third-party tort rule, those fees are consequential
damages in this case. Thus, even without testimony establishing Build' s value or
lost profits, Build will be able to prove consequential damages. Build' s claim
does not "fail[] for lack of proof." (R. 15782.) This court should reverse Judge
Harris' s dismissal of Build' s consequential damages claim.
Conclusion

This court should reverse Judge Harris' s dismissal of Build' s breach of
contract and consequential damages claims.
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DATED this 12th day of July, 2016.
ZIM1v1ERMAN JONES BOOHER

Troy L. Booher
Beth E. Kennedy
Attorneys for Appellant Build Inc.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judfclal Dfstrfct

DEC 18 20M

- r'~
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALTLAKECoUNTY,STATEOPUTAH
SALT LAKE CiTY DEPARTMENT

BUILD, INC•• a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff;

v.

CaseNo.090904101

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF

Judge John Paul Kennedy

TRANSPORTATION; CLYDE-GENEVA
CONSTRUCTORS A JOINT VENTURE, a
Utah joint ven~; W.W. CLYDE & _CO., a
Utah corporation; and GENEVA ROCK
PRODUCTS, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

THIS MATIER is before the Court on 13 motions comprising 24 binders and a poster...
sized flow chart. The Parties extensively briefed the issues and the Court heard argument on
September 23; 201_4, before talcing the motions under advisement. Three days later, the Court
entered a Minute Order granting Clyde-Geneva leave to respond to UDOT's motion qn the thirdparty complaint and directing the parti~ to submit proposed orders on all pending motions. The
p~es di4 ~o and the matter h8$ now been submitted for decision. Having carefully reviewed the
record and considering the arguments of counsel1 the Comt hereby issues the following Order.

Motions for Summary .Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and •.• the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law/' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court should not weigh eyidence
and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonnioving party. Pigs Gun Club, Inc.

v. Sanpete Couno,, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379. Moreover, ac[i]f there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt sh(?uld be resolved in favor of the opposing party.t,

Bowen v4 Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). The puipose of summary judgment is
0

.

to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense· of trial when it is clear as a matter of Jaw that the
party ruled against is not entitled to prevail." Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635
P.2d S3, 54 (Utah 1981).
The follo~ng summary judgment moti9ns are pe~ding: (1) UDOT's motion regarding'
the Legacy Highway Project; (2) UDOT's motion regarding the Arcadia Road Project; (3)

UDO'rs motion re.garding the 1-215 Project; (4) UDOT's motion re~ding consequential
damages; (S)

unbrs motion regarding the third-party complaint; and (6) Plaintiff's motion.

The Court will address each in tum.

1. UDOT's Motion Regarding the Legacy Highway Project

This motion is DENIED. Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff does not have a direct
contract with UDOT, questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff is an intended

third-party

~eficiary of the ·contract between UDOT and Clyde-Geneva. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt

Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P~d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989.) (stating that ''the int~n~on of the

parties is to be detennined from the temis of the contract as well as the surrounding facts and
cir~cesj. Plaintjff has presented cvideney of smrounding facts· and circumstances that
supports its positiob and so has UDOT. It will be up to the trier of fact to weigh the ~dence and
determine whether· Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary and thetby entitled to the relief requested.
The Court cannot to do so as a matter of law.

2
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Nor can ~e Court award summary judgment on Plaintiff's equitable claims. The law is
clear that "[r]ecoyery in quasi contract is not available where there is .an express contract

covering the subject matter of the litigation." Mann v. American W. Life I~s. Co., S86 P.2d 461;

46S (Utah 1978). But, heret the·parties dispute whether a contract exists that covers the subject
matter of the litigation. Plaintiff specifically alleges that it performed extra work that was not
contemplated by its contract with Clyde-Geneva or Clyde-Geneva's contract with tJDOT.

Moreover, Plaintiff' asserts that UDOT promised Plaintiff directly that it would pay for the extra
work. Based on the record before the Court, material questions of fact exist that •preclude
SUJinnaryjudginenl
'2. UDOT's Motion Regarding the Arcadia Road Project

.This motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. .Plaintiff's claim for 0 prompt
payment" under Utah Code Ann. § I S-6-1 fails as a matter of law because the amounts claimed
are disputed by UDOT and the contract involves disbursement of federal funds by a state agency.
See U.C.A. § 1S--6-4 ("If the agency fails to pay the amount due on tiine ·because of a dispute

between the agency and the business over the amount due or over compliance with the contract,

the provisions of this chapter do not apply."); § 15-6-6 (stating that the statute "does not apply to
contracts that involve disbursement offederal funds, or state and federal fundss by the state or its
agencies''· Plaintiff's. remaining claims are subject to questions .of fac~ including whether
UDOT breached. its contract wi~ Plaintiff, whether UDOT waived the notice provision and

whether Plaintiff's claims satisfy the requirements of the Changed Conditions Clause of the
contract specifications. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for "prompt payment" under U.C.A. § 156-1 is dismissed with prejudice, but Plainti~s remaining claims against ·UDOT regarding the

Arcadia Project survive.
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3. UDOT's M~tion Regarding the 1-215 Project
This motion- is DENIED. Questions of fact exist as to whether Change Order No. 3 was

intended to be ~- accord and satisfaction, given the language in th~ document and the parties•
course of dealing thereafter. The record contains conflicting evidence ·as to wheth~ the parties

had a meeting of the minds S\lfficient to preclude Plaintiff's claims in the instant action. See

Cove Yiew Excav(lting & Constr. Co. v. Flynn. 758 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App~ 1988) (stating
that an accord and satisfaction must generally co~ply·witb the essen$1 elements of a ~ntraet,

ine}uding a meeting of the minds). Questions of fact also ~ist as to whether Utah's Retention

.
Statute applies. to UDOT2s alleged~y tardy retentjon payments, including whether Plaintiff

complied with the prerequisites

of that statute. Accordingly, UDOT is not entitled to summary:

judgm~t on Plainturs claims regarding.the 1-215 Project.

4. UDOT's Motion Regarding Conscguential Damages
:This motion is DENIED. Initially, the Court notes that UDOT~s reply memorandum goes

well ·beyond the issues raised in Plaintiff's opposition memorandum and, therefore, the new
material will not~ considered. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (stating that a reply memorandum "shall

be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition'j. The Court further
determines that Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable

cause

of

action.

whether referred to as

"consequential damages from concurrent conduct" or "business devastation." Under Utah law;Plaintift is entitled to recover consequential damages that.were caused by·UDOT to the extent

proven to a reasonable degree of certainty and reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.

Castillo v. Atlcmta··eas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Reasonable certainty .requires
damages be prove11

''with sufficient

certainty that reasonable minds might believe from a

preponderance of ·Ute evidence that die damages were actually suffered." Kilpatrick v. W-zley,'"

4
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Rein & Fielding,~2001 UT 107, 1f 76, 37 P.3d 1130. Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence-

most notably in the form of Joan Whitacre's expert opinion - that supports its consequential
damages claim. 1Jie Court disagrees with UDOT that Plaintiff's theory of damages is either
insuffictent or somehow precluded as a matter of law. Instead, the Court concludes that there are
questions of fact as to whether Plaintiff suffered the damages claimed and in what amount.
Accordingly, UDOT is not entitled t9 summary judgment on Plaintifrs consequential damages

claim.
.S.. UDOT's ~otion Regarding the Third-Party Complaint
This motion is DENIED. ·Issues of waiver and accord and satisfaction present fact

intensive questiom that are rarely appropriate for summacy judgment. IHC Health Servs. v. D &:

K }fgmt.• Inc.., 2003 UT S, 'iJ 7 (referring to waiver as ''an intenselr fact dependent questionj;
Estate _Landscape. v. Mountain States, 344 P.2d 322, 324 (Utah 1992) (setting forth the elements
of accord and satisfaction). Here, Clyde-Geneva has pre$etlted evidence indicating that it did not
j:nteiid to, or agree to, relinquish its right to bring the subject third-party claim. For example;
Clyd~Geneva points out that the parties engaged in litigation of the subject claim both before

and after the alleged waiver ani accord and satisfaction. This tends to support Clyde-Geneva's
argument and is sufficient to preclude smmnary judgment. Similarly. questions of fact exist as to
whether the contract specifications required Clyde-Geneva to certify ihe subject claim and, if so,
••

t'f

..

•

.. ..

..

.

..

whetlier UDOT is ·nevertheless precluded from asserting this defense based on alleged statements

dming a January 26, 2009 meeting and Plaintiff's subsequent certification of its pass-through·
claim. The Court is riot in a position on summary judgment to resolve these disputes.
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Swpmary Judgment

,s
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This motion is DENIED. With respect to Plaintiff's claims rel.ating to· the Legacy Project,

the record is replete wi~ disputed questions of fact. including: (1) whether the design plans were

defective; (2) whether UDOT lmew of the alleged defective design; (3) whether UDOT agreed to
pay for extra work; (4) whether·UDOtts conduct trlggers estoppel; (5) whether Clyde-Geneva
breached its contract with Plaintiff; and (6) whether UDOT or Clyde-Geneva was unjustly

enriched. With respect to Plaintiff's claims regarding the Arcadia Project and the I-21S Project,

Plaintiff is not entitled to. summary judgment for the ·same reasons UDOT is not ~ntitled to
~ary judgment as set forth above.
Motions to Strike

· The Court'ntles on the various motions to strike as follows: (1) unors Motion to Strike
Portions of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to· Strike Additional
Paragraphs of Plaintiff's Motion ·for Partial Summary Judgment are DENIED as moot; (2)
UDOT's Motic;>n to Strike Portions of tiie Stromness Declaration and Motion to Strike Additional

Portions of the Stiomness Declaration: are DENIED as moot; (3) UDOT's Motion to Strike the

Schwarm Declaratlon is DENIED; (4) .Plaintiff's Motion to Strike UDOT's Reply/Sur-Reply and
the Adams Declaration is DENIED; and· (S) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Declarations of UDOtts
Witnesses is GRANTED in part - the portions of the declarations that contain opinion testimony
from undisclosed expert witnesses are stricken.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED thi~

LLday ofDecember, 2014.

BY THB COURT:

.,

6
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IN tiiE raliID JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE-OF UTAH

BUILD, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

V.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TANS_PORTATION, an agency of the State
of Utah; CLYDE-GENEVA
CONSTRUCTORS, A JOINT VENTURE, a
Utahjoirit venture; W. -w~ CLYDE. & CO., a
Utah CO(pbration;·. and GENEYA.ROCK
PRODUCTS·, INC., a Utah c;orporation,
Defendant.

Civil No. 090904101

Judge Ryan M. Harris

CLYDE-GENEVA CONSTRUCTORS A
JOINTVE;NTJJRE,_a Utahjoint.venture~ W.
W. CLYOE & CO., a Utah corporation; and
GENEYA ROCK PRODUCTS, INC., a Utah
cbipofatioil,
~

Third Party Plaintiffs
V.

UTAII DJ;:PARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; an agency of the State

·of Utah,
Third..Party Defendants.
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Before:tlie Court are various motjons·in liniine submitted by the parties pursuant.to the Court's
schedulin·g order of June 10, ·2015.. The Court heard oral argument on these motions on October

I, 2015. Appearing for Plaintiff Build, Inc. ("Build") were KimJ. Trout of TroutLaw, -and Clark
Fetzer of Rinehart Fetzer Simonsen & Booth. Appearing for DefendantUtah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT') were Stanfotd P. Fitts and S. Spencer Brown of Strong & Hanni.
Appearing for-Defendant Clyde-Gene,va Constructors_, a.Joint V~nture, W.W. Clyde & Co., and
Geneva Rock Products,. inc. (collectively ,·'Clyde-Geneva'') were Robert F. Babcock and Cody
W. Wilson of Babcock Scott & Babcock.

Th~ Co_urt, having n~ad. tp.e-parti~s· ri1~m_or~d~ h1 l>upport of and in ppp9sitiqg to t11.e v¢9_us

motions, and having heard oral argument on the motions, ml~$ as follows:
1. Build's Motion to Dismiss UDOT's Motions
This motion is DENIED. The Court will not dismiss other motions.

The Court has the

discretion· to consider {J.DOT's motions on their merits~ even if thos¢. rilotioris ~e i_n f~t motions
for reconsideration, and the Court chooses to exercise its di~cretion to hea.r those motions: Qn
their merits~

2. UDOT's Motion and Request for Ruling on Unresolved Legai Issues Raised in
UJ)OT's M~tion for Summary Jµdgment ()n Build's Claims Concerning the.Legacy
p·roject.
This motiqn js GRANTED in. part m1d DENIED in pa~ At the outse~ the Co"Qrt rakes::
UOOT's motion as a motion to reco·nsider the Court's prior order denyin.gUDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment Regarding the Legacy Parkway Project. Reconsideration ·of an interlocutory

order isproperiµid~Rule-54(b)-and/orRule56(d) oftheUtahRtiles ofCivil Prqcedure. The.

Court con~ludes that reconsideratl,pn of.its prior Order i~ n~c¢s,sary in ~1is c~~~-
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UDOT asks the Cc,urt to dismiss Build's four claiin.$ against .it pertaining to the Legacy
Parkway Project stated fo its Amended Co~plaint:: Build,_s .First Claim for Relief for Breach of

Implied Warranty, Buitd;s ·second Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract, Build's Third-Claim
for Relief for Contrc1ct Implied in Law, and Build's Fourth Claim for Relief for Contract Implied
in Fact.
UDOT's motion is DENIED with respect to Bttild's First Claim f~r Reli~f for Breac:b of

Implied Warrano/. The Court. concludes tha~ regardless of any lack of contractual privity, a
subcontractor who relies on plans and specifications put out for bid by the· owner of a

constructio_n proje~t may bring. aclaim for breach of implie_d warranty against the owner based
on alleged defects to the plans under Spearin v. Unit~d States., 248 u.·s. 132 (1918). See BRW,

Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons~ ·99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004). The Court finds BRW, Inc. particularly
persuasive in light of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has often drawn on Colorado faw in
developing its e¢onomic loss rule jmisptudence.
UDOT' s motion is GRANTED with respect to Build,.s Second Claim for Relief for
Breach of Contract. The Court rejects Build's argument of the existence of a direct contract
between UDOT and Build. Build's claims to a direct contract fail factually~.and fail as a matter
~

oflaw. The Court finds that, based·on Meadow Valley Contractors :v. UD01: 2011 UT 35,266

P.3d 671, the partnering ~harter, which Build daims is a contract, does not c~mstitute a contract
between the parties. Moreover, none of UDOT's interactions or dealings with Build while on the
Legacy Parkway Project created a new contract or modify any existing contract. Ratherl those
interactions are simply the reality of the management of a large-stale con~truction project Build

has f.aile9 JQ dem9nstrate a meeting ~ftµ~ minds sufficient to form a co,:itracfb.ased on: any ·9f
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these,i~tetactions. Additioµa.lly, UPOJ;cannot b~ bound contractually to _l3uild utiiess the
agreement meets the requirements of the Unih ProcurementCode~ Utah Code Ann~-§· 63G~6-

501 ~ The alleged agreements between UDOT and Build do not meet this standard. Therefore,
thete is• no direct contract between UDOT and Build
Furthermore, Build is not a third-party beneficiary to the UDOT/Clyde..;Geneva contract
Utah case law· is. dear that, w.ith respect to a claim of third-pa.rty benefici~ry status by a

subcontractor, the· written contract between the owner and general contractor must demonstrate
that tbe·contracting·parties clearly fatendedto. confer a separate-and distinct direct benefit upon

the subc~ntractc;,r. It is not enough $.at UDQT contemplated that Clyde-Geneva would_

subcontract the work at issue in this case, or even that it knewthatClyde-Geneva would
subcontract with Build~ :See SME Indus.,. Inc. v. Thomson, Ventulett, Stam back & Assocs., Inc.,
2001

UT 54, ,i,r 50-51;Am. Towers Ovmers Ass~n v. CCI Mech., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996);

~ee a_lsi:iLilley v. JP Morgah Chase, 2013 UT App 285~ ,r 5.

Therefore, Builcl's Second Claim

for Relief fa dismissed.
UDOT' s motion is also GRANTED with re_spectto Build; s Third and Fourth Claims for
Reliefbeca1.1se claims for breach of implied contracts nec-essitatethat the party making that

claini have no 'remedy-at law. Here, Build bas remedies at law by way of its direct contract
c_laims against Clyde-Genev~, an4 by way <;>f i~ Firs~ Claim fqr Re~ief for breach qf warranty
against UDOT. Therefore, Build has no claim to the equitable remedies sought in its third and
Fourth Claims for Relief.
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3~ Bu.ild's Motion in Limi~~ to Exclude T~stimony Regarding Perfonit~ce
Specifications and to Exclude Improper Legal Conclusions by Expert Witnesses.

Build,_s motion is DENIEP.The Court concludes that the.specifications regardirig pile
driving work on the L~gacy Parkway Project are ambiguous with regard to whether they .are

performan~e spedncatioJlS or design specificati<>ns. In some aspects, the specifications direct
i8

Build to do certain· things and follow certain procedures, indicating that they are design
specifications. In other aspects, the specifications provide Build discretion regarding the

per,formance ofits work. ¥oreover, pile driving tencls to be penormance-based in nature.
Therefore, because there is ambiguity with regard to_ the que$tion or'whether the pile driving
work was performed under a performance specification or a design specification, extrinsic
evidence regatd.ing the parties' intent is needed, ~d tes_tµnony by UDQT'-s witnesses that the
~pedficatioµ is, in fact., a perfonnanc~ specificatio11,_ is. admfssible ~t trial., at least_ to the ~xtent

that the witnesses were :properly disclosed.

4. UDOT's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony by Fred Stromness and Joan
Whitacre Regarding Build's Value and/or Lost Profits as a Result of Build'.s Claim
f o·r Business Devastation.
UDOT moves to exclude the testimony of Build"-s consequential damages witnesses.2
~

Fr~d Stromness and Joan Whitacre, at trial. Clyd~~Geneva joins UDOT's motion~ Thi$ motion is
GRANTED. Joan Whitacre ·offered. an opinion regarding causation in her report~ and she would

be allowed to testify as to ca~sation. But she did not ever attemptto quantify consequential
damages, and for thi~ reapon she will not allowed to testify at f;rial regarding the amounl of

consequential damages claimed by Build~ither in tenns of lo$S of Build, s -value -or in terms of
lost profits-because she provided no opinion on this subject in her report or in her deposition.
Fred Strorriness is excluded from testifying to the amount ofBuild's claimed
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co;nseque.ntial damages p~cause:Bqild has violat~dJhe disclosure r~quirements of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure in at least two particutars wfrh respect to his testimony on this claim. Fir.st,

Build violated Rule 26(a)(l)(c) of the Utah Ru1es of Civil Procedure when it failed to provide a
computation of its-claimed consequential dani.ages•in its initial disclosures, and subsequently
failing

to supplement its disclosures to provide the required computation. At the time of the

hearing, Build has still never provided :the r~quired computation, and up~m questipning~ its

counsel was unable to do so at ·the hearing. Under Rule 26,. the plaintiffhas an obligation to

provide<this information at the outset of the case, without request from the.opposing party. This

early disclosure is designed to allow early evaluation _of a case, and is essential, espec~ally when
the disclosure. involve.~ whatBuild suggests to be a claim wonh ~ore th~ $15,000~000. Build

also violated Rule 30(c)(2) of the· Utah Rules of Civil Procedure·when its counsel instructed
Fred Stromness not to answer questions pertaining: to how Build's consequential damages would

be calculated, withq~t a.riy permissible _basis. Build' s ac:ts are unacceptab_le,_ 'imd have create4 ~

situation where the defendants have not received a. damages calculation,. even long after
discovery has closed and a trial date is set. Because Build violated the Utah Rules of Civii
Procedure as noted above by failing to disclose its damages c·omputatio~~ Fred Sttomness 1s

excluded from testifying as to the amount of Build's claimed consequential damages-pursuant to
Rule 37(£) of the Utah.Rules of Civil ·Procedure.

Purthermo.re,_ Build admitted at the hearing on this motio.n that it. intends to re~y on Fred

Stroniness as its sole witness on its consequential damages claim. Because Fred Stromness's
te~tjmony ·i$ excluded, B\1ild' s daint for "Consequential Damages from Conc"Qrrent Conduct"

stated .ot:t pag~s 8-through l Oof its .Am.~nded Coinplah# fails for lack of pio9f,j1!}(1. i~
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DISMISSED.
5. Clyde-Geneva's Motion· in Limine to Preclude the Expert Testimony of Jerrold R.
·cutp.

.Clyde.-Geneva moves. to exclude the testimony ofBuild~s damages expert, Jerrold R.

Culp, at triai. .Clyde-Geneva claims that the methodology that Culp used to calculate damages on
~

the Legacy Parkway Project is inherently unreliable and was unreliably-ap_plied to the. facts.
Clyde-Geneva also claims that Culp i_s unqualified to render his opinion because he lacks the
necessary kpowledge, skill, experience and training including that he has never been a pile
drivjng contractor or a geoteclmical engineer. Clyde-Geneva asserts that:, therefore, Culp. should
be excluded from testifying pursuant to Rule 702 ofthe Utah. Ru1es of Evidence. UDOT joins

Clyde-Geneva's motioa

This mQticm is DENIED. While.the Cq_µrl recogniz~s that there may be some flaws fu
Culp's methodology,. any such flaws can be addressed through cross-examination at trial, and g;o
to Culp's

credibility. Any such flaws are not sufficientfor the Court to exercise its gatekeeper

function under Rule 702 of the.Utah Rules of Evidence.
6. Plaintiff's Motion in Limin_eto Exclude Clyde-Geneva's E.l.-pert Witne_sses
.Build. _argqes h~re that the· Court should exclude all of Clyde-Geneva's expert witne~ses
because they were improperly and untimely designated. This motion is DENIED. Clyde.:.Geneva
did not designate any of its own witnesses. Rather~ Clyde-Geneva joined in the desi~ation of

each ofUI)OT'~ expert wimesses. Ex.pe~ reports fot·each witness were produced o_n time,
pursuant to an extension granted by Build. Therefore,. there ·is no basis upon which to grant
Build' s motion.
7. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding E~pert Opinion Testimony of James Higbee
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~n<l Steven Niebergall.
Build asks: the Court .to exclude expert testimony bytwo UDOT employees-James

Higbee and ·steven Niebergall-to the extent that it constitutes expert testimony. Specifically,
Build points to several paragraphs of declarations submi~ed by these witnesses in support of
UDOT's suminary judgment memoranda, which Build argues constitutes scientific, technical, or
other specia}iz~d lawwledge on th~ subjects of geqtechnical engineering a.J)d pile driving.
The motion is GRANTED IN PART. No witness called.by either party, unless timely
disclosed.as an expertWitness, will be alfowed to testify at trial regarding-subjects that fall under

Rule 702 of ,h~ Utah RuJes ofEvidenc¢. Thus, neither Mr. Higbee notMr.Niebergall--nor any

other wi mess not properly disclosed as an expert--may testify "lJout the standard of care, or give
.
.

opinions about what is reasonable·. and what is not, unless that testimony is ·invited or the door is
opened. However) the Court recognizes that because of the technical nature ofthe: subject
matter of thisJaw~µit, $ome fact witness· testimony will be technical at ~im¢s. S11ch testimony

will be·pemiitted, and. the Court will rule on the admissibility of any specific ,testimo}l.y at the
time-of trial.
8. UDOT's Motion for Ruling and Clarification on L~·gal Issues Not Yet Addressed or
Ruled Upon ~egarding UDOT's M.o~ion f()r Summary Judgm.ent..on Bui•d;s Cl;iiins
Concerning the Arcadia Project.
In this motion, UDOT argues that Build'~ sixth claim for relief for breach of.contract
should be dismiss~d bec~use Build failed to abide by the notice provisions of its contract with
UDOT, and that Build'-s seventh and eighth claims forrelief should be dismiss·ed· because Build
bas a remedy at law-·~runely the contract between it.and UDOT.. The Court GRANTS this

motion, ·bas.ed on Me.a.ifow V~lley Corjtrac}ors. v~ UDOT, 2011 lJT 35, 2<;i6 P.3d 671.
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In Meadow Valley, the Utah Supreme Court considered contract provisions identical to
the notice provision here. The Court concluded that, based on the language of the notice

provision (Specification 0725, Section 1.7), a contractor was required to provide notice of an
"alleged change" to the project within five clays of the directive to perform the work at issue.
There, as here, the contractor argued that no notice was required because UDOT directed the
work, so it was already on notice of the change. The Utah Supreme Court di~agre~d, and held
that the contractual provision applied so long as the resident engineer who directed the work did
not believe that the work was outside of the scope of work specified in the contract.

Here, UDOT provides evidence indicating that Rex Harrison, the resident engineer, did
not believe that the direction to Build to haul waste material offsite was a change to Build's
scope of work. Build has provided no evidence to the contrary, and in fact, the evidence
demonstrates that for nearly one year after the work was performed, Build believed that the
work was within the scope of its contract. Therefore, because Build failed to provide written
notice as required by its contract with UDOT, its claim for breach of contract is DISMISSED.
Build,s seventh and eighth claims for relief are DISMISSED because, as discussed
above, a party cannot seek an equitable remedy-including contract implied in law or in fact-

when there is.an available remedy at law covering the same scope ofworlc. In this case> because
the contract between UDOT and Build contemplated extra work and changes to the work,
Build's remedy lies in that contract. Therefore, it cannot seek an equitable remedy.
9. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence Regarding Duchesne
County.
Because Build's claims arising out of the Arcadia Project were dismissed as a result of

the Court's ruling on the above motion, the parties agreed that this motion is moot.
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The Court has considered Build's objections to the form of this order, and has sustained

several of them by incorporating Build's suggested language into this order. To the extent not
incorporated herein, Build's objections to the form of this order are OVERRULED.

***EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT AS INDICATED BY THE DATE
AND SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE.***

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Nov~mber 25, 2015 04:09 PM
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

015786
10 of 10

Tab B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SECTION 00725

SCOPE OF WORK
PARTI

.1.1

t.2

1~4

GENERAL

RELATED SECTIONS

A.

Section OI282: Payment

B.

Section01355: Environnietital Protection

C.

Section OI 741: FinaJ Cleanup-

REFERENCES
A.

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and f-lighways (MUTCD)

A.

furnish alf resources and incidentals required to complete the specified work.

PARTNERING

A.

Partnering does not change the legal relationship 9.fthe parties to the Con.tract
and· dQes _not relieve either party from any oft~~ term~ of the· Contract.
.

B.

The Departmei-it encourages the formation of a strong p~rtnership among the
Department1the Contractpr, _and the Contractor's pri:ncipa'J sub~oo~ctor.~. This
partnership cf.raws on the strengths of each organizatic>n to id~ntify and achieve

1

mutual goals.

·

C.

~<.>th the.DepEt_rtment and the Contractor agree to and share equally any c_ostc; to
accomplish partnering.

D.

Wo1·kshops may he held periodicalJy as agreed by the. Contractor and the·
Department.

Sc.ope of Work
00725. ---·Page J of l I
January 1, 2005
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·1 .5:

DIFFERING SITE C_ONDITIONS, CHANGES AND EXTRA WORK
A.

Promptly:notify the Engineer in writing of alleged changes:to the Contract due todiffering site ccinditioits. extra·work.. altered wo'i·k beyond the s·coj,e of the
Contract.. or actfo11s taken by (he Depaf1ment thlll change the Contract fe1ms antj
conditions. Conditions tq repor~ include:

I.
·2.

Conditions. differing materially from those indicated in the Contract.
Unknown physical coi1ditions of ai1 unusual 'riature, differing materially
from t~1ose ordii1arily encountered and generally recognized as inherent to
the work provided foa- in the Conti·act.

B.

Op not p~rform f~Jther work 9r incur further confract it~n1 expense relating: to ·the
~iaimed change after the date th~ change allegedly occurred.. unless directed
otherwise in writing by the Ei1gineer.
·

C.

l mmediate_ly n_otify tl:te r:;1_1ginecr verbally <,if the nllegcd c~1angc 0.r cx_tra··wqrk
occasioned by differing site conditio_ns or actions_ by d,e_ Department~ Provide the
following applicable infor1iiati'on to the Engineet· i11 Writing within five.-calendar
·gays of the dafo t_hc change or actior1 was noted:
1.
The d~te,of occ.urrencc and the nature;: and circumstances ofthe QCCurrence
that constitute a:change.
2.
Name, title~ and activity ofeach Department representative· knowledgeable
of the claimed change.
3.
Identity of ant documents and the substance of any orai communication:_
invo_lved in the claimed change.
.
4.
B~is ·rot a ·claim qf accelerated, schedule performance, if appJicabl~~
5.
Basis for a claim that the work is not required by the Contract. if

6.

applicable.
Failure,. to provide the' required notice·constitutes a waiver of any and all.

a

cJairn~ that may ari_se a;, r.esult of t~_e_ aUeg~d cl)ange~ Departt~ent do~s
not ali9.w adjustments to the Contract that benefit the Contractor unless_ the
·contractofhas provided the required written notice.

D.

Pai~cular efe.men'-'5 of contract perfo1mance for whic"h additional compensation
may be sought include:
Pay items that have been or may be affected by the claimed change.
I.
Labor or materials, or both, that are added, deleted or wa~ted by the
2~
claimed· <;ha.nge and what e_quipment idled or r~quired._
Delay and disruption in the manner .~nd sequence of p~rformance that has
3.
been or will be cai1sed,
Adjustments to cc;mtract pr~~es, delivery schedules. staging, _and contract
4.
time estimated due to the claim~d change.
Estimate of the time within which. the Departtnent must respond to the
-5.
~oti~e to minimize cost~ delay, or disruption ofpetformance.

is

Sc.ope of Work
00725 ~.Page 2 of 11

Jan~ary 1, 2005
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E.

After notifying the Engineer. and in the ~1bscncc ofdi~c~tjons rcc~ivcdto the
authorized. representative ot lhe Department, continue diligenl
prosecution <>fthe work undet· the Contta.cr to the maxinium. extent possible undei•
the.contract provisions.
contrary

F.

fro•n an

Within IO calendar days after reccipl or not'ice. the Engineer responds in writing

to the Contractor to:
Confirm that a change occurred and~ when necessary.. direct the method
I.
2.
3.

4.
G.

1.6

an.d manner Qf further performanc~~ .or
Deny that a change occurred and. when necessary .. direct the method and
manner offurther performance, or
Advise the. Contractor that information necessa,·y for deciding to confirm
or deny the change has not been submitted~ and indicate what information
is needed foHurther 'review and date by which the Contractor should
suqmit it to the Engineer. The Enginee1· ~spqnqs to_ such additional
information wi~hin IO ca lcndar days qf receipt from the Contl'actor.
Modify-the Contract.in writing accordingly.

Any adjustments. !llad~ to the Conlra~t dq 11(,)t include incn;ased compensation or
tiiue extens.ions for delay ~suiting from the Contractor's failure to provide
additional .information requested by the Engineer.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF WORK

A.

The: Engineer re~erv~s tl~e r.ight at any tim~ during the w9rk to.ma~e written
changes in quantities and alterations in the work that are necessary to
satisfactorily. complete the p,~oject.

·

B.

Such changes in quantities· and alterations·do not invalidate the Contract or release
the surety, and the Contractor agrees to perforin the Work as altered.

C.

Department adju.sts the Contract, excludfng anticipated .P~fits, if the alterations or
changes in quantities significantly change the character of the work under the
Contract.
1.
Such alterations or chang~s ~an be.in.themselves significant changes to the
character of the work, or by their effect1 can cause other work to become

signiftcantiy different in character~
2.
3.

D.

Agree upori the basis for Contract adjustment before beginning work.
Ir a Qasis c(lnnot be _agreed upon. ·th~ Engineer may order the work to
proce~d under the Force Account provisions ofSyction 01282.

If the alterations or changes in quantities do not significantly change the character
ofthe work to be performed under the Contract, the Department pays for ·the
altered work as provided elsewhere in the· Contract.

Scope of Work
00725-Page3 of 11
January .t , i005
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E.

The term ""significant change'~ applies onlytQ_the fo.llowin.g circumstances:
I.
When the character . ofthe altered 'Work differs materially.in kind ot nature
from that involved or iilcluded in the original proposed constrµction; oi•
2.
When a major item of work. as dcfineddsewher~ in the (.::onlract. is
incr~ascd in ~x~ess of 125 percent or d<!cre~scd befo.w 75 p~rc~nl of the
original contract quantity.
n.
Any adjustment for an increase in quantity applies only to that
·portion i11 excess ~f 125 percen.t of the 9rigi11a_l con.tract qmmtity.
b.
When a majQr it~ni of work is decreased below75 percent of the
estimated qua11thy, the Department pays actual costs up to a
·maximum amoi1nt equal to the dollar v~li.ie of 75 perce_nt of the
e.stimatec.i quantity at the Contract unit price-. The Depart1nent does
not allow for any other ct>nipensation resulting fi·om work
d~creaseq befoW75 percent of the estimat~d qua.nHty.
3.
When a.minor item qfwQrk. as d~fined dsewher~ ii1 the ContrlJct, is
in~rc·~sed in excess of I·SO percertt·or: decreased below 50 percent of the
original contract ·quantity~
·
a. · Any adjustnwnt tbr an increase ~n quantity applies only to t}:lat
portion i.n ~x~ess of 150 perccnrofthe origfoal co_n.tr~~t quantity.
b.
When a mino1~ itcri1 of work is.decreased .bdow·SO pci•ccnt ofthe
estimated quantity, the Department p·ays actual costs up to a
max_imum amount' equal_ tc>. the. do_llar val~e _of 5°() percent of the
estim~ted quantity. ~t the Coi1tract. unit prfo~,. The bepartment does

not allow for ~ny.other compensatio1t resultii1g fron1 work
4.

1.7

de~reased beJ9~· 5.0 p~rcient of the ~ti mate~ quantity~
Adjustments may be ~ither for or against the. Cont~actor in such an: amount
·the Engineer may determine to be fair and equitable.

SUSPENSIONS OF WORK ORD.ERED BY THE ENGINEER

A.

.lf_the Engineer suspends or <iel_ays in writi~g ~,e perf~r,rian~~ of ~I I or :any pc;>rtion
<lfthe, work for an unre.asonabJe per.ioc_i of't~me (not_origin~fly anticipated,

customary, or inherent fo the construction industry)~_and the Contractor believes
t~~t a:dditional compensation qt c9ntract time or both ~re due as a_ result of such
$.uspension or qefay, submit to the l;ngineer ~ wri.tten.requ~~Hqr adjufittne.nt .
within seven calendar days of receipt of the ·notice to resume wqrk. Explain in the
request the reasons and support for such adjustment.·
·

B.

Upon receipt of request,' the Engi_neer:
I.
.Evaluates the request.
2.
Adjusts (excluding profit)and modifies the Contract in writing
.-~ccordin.gly~ if
E11gineer agree~ t.hat:
a.
°The susp~nsion increased the cost and/or time requi.red for the
performance -ofthe Contract

the

Scope of Work
00725.:- Page 4ot' JI
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b.

The _suspension was caused by conditioiis beyond the c.~nfrol of
and not th~ fooft of the Gontra~(or, it.s suppli~_rs, 9r sµbcontra<;tors

c.

The suspension· was·not caused b,Yweathcr.

at any approved tier;

t.8

C.

The.Engineer notif1e~ the Contractor of whether or no~ JU1 adjustnJenl of the
Contract iswarranted.

D.

Dep~utm~ntdoes notal!o~ adju~tmC!nt to th~ Contrac~ unle~$ the Contractor has
submitted the request for adjustment within .seve.n cal~ndar days of-receipt of the
notice· lo re..~ume work.

E.

Department does not allow adjustmcn~ to the Contra-ct to the extent that _.
pe1foniiance would have been suspended or delayed by ahy other cause, or for
which an _adjustm~nt is pro\dded· for or excluded unde1; any·other term or
condition.of thi~ Qontract.

MAIN'TAINING TRAFFIC
A.

Keep roads ·opeli to traffic during the work and work suspensions oi- p1·ovide a·nd
main~ai11 dcfour roads as specified or·dirc~tcd.
I~
Keep publicly 13.,n_d pdyately us~d roadways in a cqndition that saf-'ely and
adequateiy accommodates traffic 24 hours a day and seven days a week.
2.
Provide traffic control in coinpliance,with the,currenteditioh of the
Manual on Uniform-Traffic Con~rol Devic~s for Street$ aod Highways
(MUTCD). the traffic Control provisions the Specifications. and the
Traffic Control Plans.
·
~Maintain the sections r:;,f road unqergoiflg improvement.
4.
Failure to maintain traffic is cause for the Department to· take action to
meet the requirements of this specification. D~partment deducts its costs
incurred_ in such action from money due the Contractor.

or

~-

B.

Snow removal is not required during periods. of winter ~hutdown or when the·
Departtnent sttspends construction operations•. The" Department does not
additiom~Jly ·compensate for maintenance except forspecific work directed by the
Engin~er.

C.

Suspensions ordered by the Engineer: The .Department maintains temporary
roadway"s and portions of the project during wo1~k suspensions.
1.
Resµ~e, rpai_nt~nanc.~ f9r tt,e entire proje(?t on(?~ work procee~.s~
2.
Replace:or restore ahy work 01· matedaJs lo$t or dam·aged because of
tem·porary use of the project.
··
3.
Remove worko_r materials used for temporary maintenance; arid complete
the project as though the. work had been continuous and without

interference.
Scope of Work
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4.

Dcpartnicnt ·pays for maintcnan~e required for events .beyond the
Contt-aclo(s control dudng work suspensions at c·m1ttacfprices.or as extra
work.

D.

Other Suspefisions of Work: Maihtain tl,e roadway at no additional cost to
Oepartnient to accommodate t~ffic during SL1spe1isions resulting from~

i.
3.

Seasonal o.r climaii9 condhions.
Failure to correct condi.tions unsafe for the workers or the general public.
Failure to ~any out orders of the ~·ngin.eet.

4.

Any other reasons caused by the Co!ltractor.

2.

1.9

1.10

USE OF ON-SITE MATERIALS

.A.

Obtain ~pprovtil b~fore.. using e,:tcavated, n,aterials found o~ the wqrk siJe ~hat a.re
·suitable for completing other bid items ofwork. The Department pays for the
quantity of ex:cavated· mutefoi:ls at the Contract unit price'.for "i"oadway excavation
and u~der the pay item fqr which th~ n)~teriat·is used.

B.

Replace ·extavated material used.for completing other bid lteins·ofwork with
a<!cepta~Je ma~erial .~t no ·additipi,al cost ~o the J)epartment.
L
Oepattme.nt doe$_ not charge tpr th~ materi~ls used~
.
2.
Obtain approval before excavatingmateriai outs"ide· grading Hn1itsbut
within the highway right-of-way~
J·.
Compact replacement material to the density requirements specified for
roadway embankmcntconstructioi1.
·

C

Struc·ture_ materfa11s designated for 1·emoval may be qsed te_mporarily fa the work.

FINAL CLEANUP

A.

i.U

·

Clean' the highway, proj~t, borroW and. local matedal source sifos~ and all areas·
occµpi~d i" cqnnection with the work all rubbish, excess materials, t~mpornry
structures, and equipment, etc. before final inspection and acceptance. Refer to
Section OJ 741.

ot

RESTORATION OF SURFACES. OPENED BY.PERMIT
A.

Allow individl.lals, firm or corporaiion-With authorized permits to enter the project
to construct or reconstruct any utiHty service.

B.

Repair damag~ ~ause~ by the._permit.h~,ld~r when dire:cte~. D~partm~nt pays for
repair work as extra work, or as provided in the Contract.

S~ope of W9rk
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t.12

RAILWAY -HIGHWAY PROVISIONS
A.

The Department arranges with the railway for-new crossit'igs or fo1· existing
crossings used during the work.

~

B.

Obtain ~pproval from the rai lwtty and pay for the use or crossings not specified in
the Contract.

C.

Avoid accidents., damage. unnecessary de.lay .. or any interrerence with·.thc
movemenfoftra ins .. traffic of the raihvay compa11y. or othet property.

D.

Department does ~ot reimburse for raili•oad flagging and inspection.

E.

H_old a precons.truction conferenc~ ancJ give writt~n notice.t9. lhe Manage.r of
indus.try anq Public Projects or equivalent position for the railrc;>ad ~omp~ny,
when railroads are fovolved, at le'ast I5. days before heginoing_any co1istrLiction·
work on railroad right-of-way·. Coc,rdimile ·~1 work schedule based on the actual
date both partfos can begin work.

F.

Give at least 4~ hours verqal n.otice to the Manager of Track M~inten.ance or
equivalent position for the.railtoad company having· responsibility for the. area the
project is in before beginr1ing \vork once the work dates have been established.

G.

Give writt~n ·notification to the Superintendent or equ}valent position fe~t:five.
days befonfany cancellation of work~ and 15 days before continuing work.

H.

Execute a f.llght:-of-gn~ry Agreement with the railroad company priqr t~l
performing arty work within thetaifroad's right-of-way. Send executed cop_ies .of
this agreement to the Engineer and UDOrs· Region Utilities and Railroads
Coordinator.

I.

J.

Cleanup the rigbt..:of-way to the satisfaction of the railroad company. Contractor
pays for any cleanup done by the raiJroad compa.ny"to the railroad company's
right-of-way that should have been don~ by the Contractor.

Railroad coinpany pefaoqnel do flagging and inspection when work: and/or
ff of any of the taikoad company's

equipment o'fth~ Contra~tor is. within 2.5

tracks.
K.

Determine the cost of required railroad flagging and/or inspection and cleanup
crew. Include these costs in mo~Hization. ·

Scope of Work
Q0725- Page 7 of t I

January 1,.2005

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

002432LE_04993.3

l.13

L.

lJDOT deducts payment under-a construction accounting iten1 foa~ "Railroad
Flagging. l'nsp·ection and Cl~amlp/~ and_ pay~ the .railroad di reedy
v~rified
billings. No qther compcnsatiqn tp the -Contra~tor forthis item is allowed.

M.

Refer to proje·ct plans for name~ ofrailrqad companies.•

for

~ONSTJ{UCTION OVER OR ADJACENT TONA VIGAB.LE WATER.~
A.

Do not interfere :with the navigation of waterways when conducting work over,
on, or adjac~nt to navigable w~tcrs.

B.

Comply with ali .conditions ofU,e pe·rmit from the U.S. Coast Guard or the U.S.

Army Corps of Etjgineers.

1.,14

CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSIBJLITY FOR WORK
A.

Protect il,e work against i1tjury or damage frorn all causes whether or not related
to performing the ·work until written accepti.itnce of the proJect is given.

B.

Re.build. repai'r, restore, and ri1ake good a-U iosses~ huui'ies, Or" daniages to· ariy
portion of ~he work, undeL· the conti"ol ofth~ Co11tractorat no cost to the
Qepartment h~tore receiv'ing final acceptance.
·

C.

Rebu i1d 1 repair, -resfore, and n1ake good all loss~s, injuries, or damages to any
portiqn of the work, f.ll1t under the control the Co.ntr~ci61:, un.der agreed ~nit
prices or as extra work urider Sec.lion 0 1282.
l.
Items not under the Contractor's-control include, -but are not limited to,
acts of God or other cataclysmic phenomenaof nature, acts of the. public
enemy, or acts of gov~rnr,nentai authorities. damage cau~ed 'by third party

of

errant vehicles, and vandalism.

D.

When work is sqspended for any cause:

t-.
2.

:t
4..

l.15

·

•P.rotect thC: project'from damage.
Provide for normal drainage~
Erect _any necess~ry t~mporary st.rµc.tures .. signs, or othei" facilities.
Maintajn all newly established plantings, s~~_ding. and ~odding and protect
new tree growth and other designated vegetative growth in acce·ptable
condition.

ENVIRONMENTAL FROTECJ"'ION.
A.

Refer to S~ion

m·3s~.
Scqpe QfW~rk
00725 ... Page S· of 11

January I, 2005

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

002433IB_049.934

1.16

VALUE F;NGINEEIUNG -CQNTRACTORPROPOS.ALS
A.

.Stwings resulting from a Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECPJ oi°fered by
tbe Cont,·actor and approved by the Depai"tment is slufrcd equally.
·

B.

Base contract bid prices on specifie.d work rat~er than on VECPs ~hat are subject

to Depart111ent approval. lfa VECP is rejected. complete the Contract as bid.

C.

·t.17

The Department consider~ proposals that may potenfo:,lly &}!suit in savings with9ut
damaging essential functions.and chat·acteristics·ofthe facility, including but not
limited to service lite> econoniy of operation, ease of-maintenance. desired ability,
saf~ty, and approx,imate estimated~avings!

VALUE ENGINEERING -SUBMITTING PROPOSALS
A.

Submit t_he fqllowing ri1atetia(~ and informatfon with each proposal!
1.
A statement thatH1e submi~sion is a VECP.
2..
A descriptfon the:existing work and the proposed cha1igcs for
perforrning the work. Disctiss the comparative aqvantages and

of

&sad vantages of each.

3.

..

.

A complete s~tofplans ~nd specifications showing proposed revisions to
the oflginal Contract.

4.
·$.

6.
7.

A detailed cost~stimate for p~rforming thew~rk under the existing
Contract and underthc; proposed change.
A time frame within which the Department must tn'ake a decision.
A statement ofthe probable effect ·the proposal would have on. the contract
completion time.
A description of any previous use or tests of the proposal,the conditkms,
and the result and the dates> project numbers, and the Department's action
on the proposa1 if previously submitted.

B.

The Department determines and notifies the Contractor within five working· days
that .there is ir1sufiicient revie~dm~ for a· respo·nse~.

C.

The Departn1erit evaluates the need for a non-compensable delay adjustment to
the Contract based on ~dditiorial review time necess·ary and .its effect ori the
Contractor•s .schedule.
.

D.

The Contractor has no claim against the Department for compensable or
·nonc6IT1pensable delay re$i.Hting froni the failute·to respond within the-tilne
indicated in this artic.1~ when additional infor111ation is nece~sary to comple((; t~e
review.

Scope of Work
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1.18

VALUE ENGINEERJNG·-CONDITlONS FOR PROPOSALS

A.

The Oepartm~n·t only consid~rs VE(:Ps that.meet the following conditions:
I.
Yalue en_gineer1ng pro.posals. regardle·ss of their approval by the
Departmen4 apply only to the currei1t proposal and.become ·prope·rty of the

Dcparb'r!e~t;
a.
Submit proposa,s without restricdons· on use or disclosure.
b.
The Depa11ment may dupl icate:or disclbse any data necessary to
.use the proposal.
c.
Th~ Department ~.an apply a proposal for general us~ on other
C:0ntracts it administers.
d.
Th~ purpose of this provision is·to ensure legnl right with respect
t9_ paten~ed materials qr proc~sses.
8.

lJs~ only proven features tha,t have been- employed under similar conditions or
projects acceptable to·the Dep~rtment.

C.

·the O~partinent decides whetlwror not tq accept.a proposal. Basis for proposal
rejectioit inch.ide 1-equirements for excessive 1·ev"iew~ evaluation.arid/or

investigation, or inconsistelicy with project ~e~ign policies or criteria.

D.

E.

The Department rejects proposals that;
1.

Provide equivalentoptions·to thosfatready in

i!'

R.e,duce overail pavem~nt str1.1ctural value.

the Contr_act

VECPs related to pavement section changes must inciude the following:
I.
A pavern~nt design f~r each
_section i"~ the proposal, perf~rmed
according to the UDdT Pavement Management.and Pavement D~sign

pavesnen.t

Guide.
:2.

·

A life-cycle cost analysis that identifies the benefits, pverall co.stsavings·,
or in~rease in quality. ·to 1he Department, based 011 the new pav_ement
section.

3.

F.

Doci.mie11tation from· an AASHTO ·accredited iab regardi~g the
deter01_i_riati~n of-strj.tcti:Jral properties pf any mat¢.r~a"ls not currentty
"identified within-the contra~t.

Th~ Departinelit may reject proposals that:·
1.-

Contain revisions ~he Departm·ent is already" ce>nsidering or ha~. approved
for the C<;>ntract.

2.

Do not generate: sufficient savings.

3.

Do not provide addit1·onal inforrriat1ori as-requested by the Department
incJuding_requestsfor fie~d.investigatlQi1 r.es~lts and s~rvey~, d~sign_
c:ompu.tations, and field change sh~et for pn:>posed c,!esign ch~nges.
Scope of Work
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G.

If the proposal is rejected. the Contractor has no claim lo additional costs or
delays. includi_ng development costs, l_oss of anticipated profits, or increased

material or lahm· costs.
H.

The Engineer can reject all unsatisfactory work resulting from an approved
proposal.

I.
2.
3.

Remove rejected work and reconstruct under the original contract
p1·ovisions at no additional cost·to Department.
Rcimbur~cment for modifications to the proposal to adjust field or other
conditions is limited to the total amount of the contract bid prices.
Rejection or limitation of reimbursement is not basis for any claim ag~inst
the Department.

The Department does not consider savings generated by contingency ilems when
it is reduced as part of a VECP, unless it can be tied to a reduction in• contract

I.

time.
1.19

VALUE ENGINEERING - PAYMENT
A.

The Dcpartrnent pays by change order for Value Engineerii1g proposals accepted
in whole or in part. Department pays as follows:
1.
The Contract incorporates changes in quantities of unit bid items, and/or
new agreed p1·ice items, as appropriate.
2.
Department pays directly for cost of the revised work. The Department
pays the. Contnictor 50 percent of tht! savings reflected by Lhe difference
between cost of revised work and the original bid price.
3.
Department does not reimburse costs to develop, design, and iniplement
the proposal.
4.
Only a Contractor may submit proposals and be reimbursed for savings.
The Contractor can submit proposals for an approved subcontractor.

PART2

PRODUCTS

Not used

PARTJ

EXECUTION

Not used

END OF SECTION
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY ,

STATE OF UTAH

-oOoBUILD INC. , a Utah
corporat i on,

)Depositioil o.f :
)

)REX VERNAL HARR3SON

Plaintiff ,

•

)
)

vs .

)

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
)
TRANSPORTAtION, an
)
agency of t h e State of
Utah; CLYDE - GENEVA
)
)
CONSTRUCTORS A JOINT
VENTURE , a Utah j o int
)
)
ventrire; W. W. C~YDt &
CO., a Utah corpGration;)
and GENEVA ROC~
f
PRODUCTS , INC . , a Ut~h
)
corporation,
jciyii Np .
)

Q~U9P4J0 1

)

).Judge Kenneciy

Defendants.

- - - -- - - - - -- - - - -

)

- oOo August

16 ,

2013

STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center,
Salt Lake City,

-

9 : 00

a.m.

Suite 500
Utah

J~~nifer L . Nater
Registered Professional Repo-r t er
Ce~ t i f ied Sho~t h arid Reporter
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003501

D.eposition of ~ex Vernal .. Harriso_n

E~~INATION

Bl MR. TROOT

August i6-, 201.3

Page 16

1

Duchesne County and UDOT that I was that person

2

in responsible ch~rge t~ere.
For the Bridgelcµid project, was

Q.
4

there a cooperative agreement between Duchesne

5

County and l.1])0T?

6

A •.

Yes, there was.

7

Q.

Let me go back.

e·
9

10
11

When you say proposal , did Horrocks

Engineers make a proi;:>'osal to UDOT

to

act- as the

resident engineer for the Brid~eland project~

A •.

No.

We we·re selected be.cause we

12-

were in a preapp,roved pool of consulta_nts to dq

13

local government project work.

14

out of that pool.

We were selected

I guess, yes, w~ did prop_ose to get

_15

16

in the pool.

17·

Q.

When yo_u say selected, would

t

be

18-

correct in understanding that you were seiected

19.

by UDOT?

20

A •.

We. were. $elected by Duchesne County.

21

Q.

I see.

22

Did UDOT approve of that

se1ection?

23

A.

Yes, they did.

24

Q.

Let's D\Ove to the Arcadia project.

2·5

Can you tel1 us, p1ease, what your

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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Depo~itio.n of Rex Vernal Harrison

August 16,. 2013

EXJl.MINATION BY MR. .TROUT

Page 17
1
2

ro1e in the Arcadia project was?

Here· ~gain, we have two.

A.

I assume

3

you' re talking .about the latter one that Bui lo.·

4

was under contract- with?

5

Q.

I am, sir.

6

A.

.My role there was also as the

7

resident engineer on that project during

ff

construction.

9

10

Were you, in addition to that role,

Q.

project manager?

11

:A.

Yes.

12

Q.

.Was yQur- engineering stamp on the

13

plans for the Arcadia project that we've .~ust

14

been discussing?

It is, along with our structural

15

16
17
18
19

20
21

2·2
2.3
24

25

engineers
Q.

who designed the structure.
When ciid you begin your role as the

resident engineer for the Arcadia project?

A.

I think that particular date is

probably on a contract in ZOOS.

Q.

Would that contract be between· the

Department and Horrocks Engineering?

MR. BRAITHWAITE:

Obj_ection, calls

for a legal cdnclu~ion.
MR. FITTS:

Join.

Jenni•f er L. Nazer RPR,

CSR

Reporters In.c.
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Dep·osi ti.<;m of .I{ex V:ernal. Harrison

EX~INATI.ON BY MR. .TROUT

August

i~,.

201.3

Page 62

i

Exhibit 196?

2

A.

I believe that to be correct.

~

Q.

I£ I. ~derstand your review of the

4

project specifications, the contractor was

5

al1o:wed to dispose of excavated material in

6

waste areas along the roadway, as provided for

7

in plan note number 2, correct?

g·

A.

(Deposition Exhibit 208 was ~arked

9

10
11

Yes.

for identification.)
Q.

Sir, ¥ou•ve been handed what's been

12

marked as Exhibit 208 for identification.

13

you have that document in front of you?

Do

14

A.

I do.

15

Q.

·can you ~dentify 208 for us, pleas_e?

16

A.

Let me review it here a minute·.

17

Q.

Certair:ily ..

18.

A.

Okay.

19

Can YQU. id~~tify Exhibit 208,

2-0

please?

21

·A.

Yes.

Th1s is a letter to Pa·ul

2.2

Adams, pro • ect manager for Build, :t·nc., J~nuary

23

~4,· 2008, referencing the final inspection and a

24

punch list genercited on November 20, 2007; and

25

additional items that were needed as identified

Jennifer L_. Nazer R,PR, CSR
Reporters In.c.
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Oeposition of R.ex Vernal Harrison

August i6,. 2013

EXJ..MINATION BY MR •.TROUT

Page

1

Engineers• participation in the Legacy project,

2

or what's known as the Legacy project, Segment

3

3?

4

5
6

A.

I was aware that we were doing some

de$ign with UDOT 6h that, yes-.

Q.

As part of preparing design with

7

UDOT on Legacy Segment 3, were you aware that

a·

Horrocks Engineers, or employees of Horrocks,

9

were reporting to someone by the name of Bethany

10
11

Shingleton -at a company ca:Ll.ed HDR?

A.

(Deposition Exhibit 222 was maiked

12
13
14

t'm not aware of any of that, no.

for identification.)
Q.

Sir, you've been handed what's been

.15

marked as Exhibit 222 £or identification.

16

ask you to review that document and indicate to

17

me when you are completed with your review.

18

A.

Yes.

I'd

Exhibit 222 is a letter from

19

mys~lf, Rex ·Harrisqn, to Paul Adams, referencing

20

an error that. we found in the elevations that we

21

had previously given the contra.ctor,. and a

22

r~medy to correct. that, acpepting responsibility

23

for that srror also.

24

25

Q.

And just so that we have a frame ·of

reference, Exhibit 222 is a letter drafted by

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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Deposi tio.n of ~ex Vernal. Harriso_n

EXAMINATION BY MR. .TROQT

August i6, 201.3

Page 86
1

you, correct?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

Dated March 15th, 2007, correct.?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

And it deals with the sloped bearing

6

seats at the eight steel beveled plates welded

7

tQ the bottom of ·the girder seats in abutments l

s·

and 3, correct?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

It's my understanding that that -was

il

an error on behalf of Horrocks Engineers,

12

correct?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And it's my 1.lllderstanding· tha-t:

15

Horro.cks Engineers :Paid ~e cost of correcting

16

that· error,. correct?

17-

Cor:r;ect.

18

(Deposition Exhibit 2·23 was marked

19
20

f,o:t id.entification.)

Q.

Sir, you've been handed.what's been

21

marked as Exhibit 223 for identification.

2.2

you!ve had a _chance to rev.1ew that, will you ·sQ

23

signify and I'll ask. you a question or two~

24

25

When

Did we no_t have this -similar .letter

A •.

earlier?

Jenni fer L_. Nazer RP~, _CSR

Reporters In.c.
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Deposition of Rex Ve~nal Harrison

August 16, 2013

EX1'.MINATION BY MR. TROUT

Page 87
1
2
3

I

Q.

don't think so.

I

think there is

a difference, sir.

A.

Okay.

4

Okay, yeah, it is different.

5

Yes.

This is a letter over my

6

signature to Cameron Erickson, February 23rd,

7

2009, transmitting pay estimate number 17 along

8

with clarifications on some of the items.

9

Would I be correct in understanding

Q.

10

that you drafted ·this letter for transmittal on

11

or about February 23, 2009?

12

A.

Cotr_ect.

13

Q.

And in the second full sentence of

14

the first paragraph it says, quote, The current

15

estimate number 17 is prepared based upon Build

16

not accepting the proposed settlement offer of

17

November 26, 2008, period, end quote.

18

read that correctly?

Did I

19

A.

Yes, you did.

20

Q.

Would I be correct in understanding

21

that with respect to item number 104, the fuel

22

and asphalt cost adjustment, that i t was your

23

decision to back that out of pay estimate number

24

17 when Bui1d did not accept the proposed

25

settlement?

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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EXi~INATION B~ MR. .TROUT

1

A.

That is correct.

2

Q.

And you made that decision as the

3

resident engineer with respect to the Arcadia

4

project; correct?

A.

5

6

In consultation with Robert Westover

in UDOT, yes.

7

So would I be corre.ct in

.Q.

g·

understanding Mr . . Westover was advised anci

9

concurred in .your decision?.

10

11

12
13'

·A.

Yes.

That's the way I uno.erstood

Q.

Mr. a:~rrison, what did you cio to

it .

prepare for ·this deposition today?

14

A.

I got ~6dd sleep l~st rtight.

is

Q.

Anything else?

16

A.

Not really, no.

The fil~s are

It would ~lmost b.e impos$ible to ·go

17

sc~ttered..

18.

back and do a lot of that research, but I don't

19

even know where file$ Q.re.

20

somewhere, but there's not a lot that I could

21

re~llY look at.

2.2

Q.

Th~y• re at UDOT.

°In preparation for this depos1t1on,

23

did you have any meetings with Mr. Fitts or

24

anyone from his organization prior to today?

25

~ugust i6,. 201.3

A.

Just briefly this morning prior to

Jenni.fer L.. Nazer RPR, CSR

Reporters Inc.
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Deposition of Rex Vernal Harrison

August 16, 2013

EX~.MINATION BY MR. TROUT

Page 93
1

interpretation of contract drawings after the

2

work is completed?
MR. BRAITHWAI.TE:

3

I ' l l just object.

4

It assumes facts not in evidence, and incomplete

5

hypothetical.
MR. FITTS:

6
7

I'll join, and calls for

a legal conclusion.

$

Q.

You can answer.

9

A.

I don't understand that question.

10

Q.

All right.

11

into subparts.

12

hypothetical.

13

Let me break it down

And I'll ask it in the form of a

If a contractor discovers that; on a

a

14

UDOT project, the resident engineer made

15

mistake or error in the interpretation of the

16

contract drawings arid specifications, and the

17

contractor discovers that mistake or error after

18

the work is complete, and the contractor

19

incurred expense associated with that mistake or

20

error by the resident engineer over and above

21

that which the contractor contemplated he was

22

going to expend in the performance of the work,

23

what process, procedure, or portion of the

24

Standard Specifications is the contractor

25

supposed to fo·llow under that circumstance?

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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EXAMINATION BY MR. FITTS

Depo!li ti.9n of P.-ex Verna+ Harrisc_n

~ugust

i6,

2013

Page 94
MR. FITTS:

1

2

Same objections as

previously.

3

t1R,.

4

THE WITNESS:

BRAITHWAITE:

Join ..

The process he would

5

follow would be the one that was initiated with

6

auild on this project, and that is to escalate

7

and ask for a claims review at the regional

8

level.
MR. TROUT:

9

All right, sir.

10

are the questions I have.

11

for your attention today, sir.

Those

Thank you very much

12

THE WITNESS:

13

(Deposition Exhibit 224 was marked

14

for identification.)

15
16

17

Qkay.

EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITTS:
Q.

Rex, 1et me hand you what's been

18

marked as Exhibit 224.

19

you recognize?

Is that a document that

20

A.

Yes, it's one I recognize.

21

Q.

Do you know what it is'?

22

A.

It's a cooperative agreement b~tween

23

UDOT and Duchesne County for the construction of

24

the Arcadia Road.

25

(Deposition Exhibit 225 was marked

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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Deposition of Rex Vernal Harrison

EXJ1.MINATION BY MR. FITTS

August 16, 2013

Page 116
THE WITNESS:

1

That would be the
I think it was

2

earthwork foreman at the time.

3

both Cameron and Paul at the time that were out

4

there.

5

where they could possibly waste some additional

6

material.

Myself and Lavon had looked at places

7

Q.

Within the project right of way?

8

A.

Within the project right-of-way, and

9

places where we couldn't accept any more

10

material, be wasted.

11

drainage or add additional weight on slopes'

12

stabilities that were already moving.

13

Either it would impede

MR. TROUT:

I'm going to place an

14

objection on the record to the entire answer by

15

the witness, and tie it to my original objection

16

to the lack ·o.f foundation and objection to form.

17

Q.

Did you exercise engineering

18

judgment in evaluating whether or not additional

19

material could be placed within the project

20

right-of-way?

21

22
23

MR. TROUT:

Object to the form, lack

of foundation.

THE WITNESS:

Yes, my personal

24

engineering judgment along with our geotechnical

25

recommendations that we were· aware of subsurface

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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Deposii:i.e,n of llex Vernal Harrison

EXi.MINATION Br MR. FITTS

August i6,. 201.3

Page 117
1

movement in that particular slide area.

2

that was part .of the engineering judgment that

3

went into the· determination,~..

4

5

Q.

Were slope stability issues part of

that analysis you made?

MR. TROUT:

6
7

So yes,

Object to the form, lack

of foundation.

fes.

iHE WIT~ESS:
Q.

Is that what you were referring to

10

when you talked about additional weight being

11

placed on some of the slopes?

12
13
14

MR. TROUT:

Object to the form_, lack

of foundation.
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

There's

15

certainly, in $lides as we had there, that's

16

pretty major soil failure· movement areas

17

identified by our geotech.

18

stabilize it, and the recommendation in the

19

design of the project was we would add more

20

weight on the toe down next to the bridge to

21

stabilize the movement of the soil above it,

2.2

which seems to have worked, basically, as

23

planned, looking at it with history now.

24

were concerned about adding additional weight on

25

top of those particular failure planes.

We tried to

But we

Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR
Reporters Inc.
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Pr oject No:
locatlon:
Name:
Description:

-

~

-- ~-··-·- - - -

.

-

lla

STP-1544(1)5

Change Order #:

ARCADIA ROAD
BUILD INCORPORATED
APPROACH SLAB #2 MODIFICATION

Charge ID No.:
Contract Date:
PIN:

3
50162
7/12/2005
000616

Contract Monies All ocated To Date(lnformation Only)
Original Contract I
COs to Dato
WORKING
ICurrenl Contract Amount (Includes COs to date
$34,870.75
$2,676,511 .65 I
$2,711,382.40
5
I
·•
l9ngmal Contract Unit,
Agreed Unit

Code

Tlmo Extension

G roup I Alpha I Originator

·3. 1 G

I

I

1

BASIS OF PAYMENT.

ESTIMAT ED QTY.
UNrT OF
tNCREASE/DESCREASE MEASUREM_Ef:'JT

ITEM

Each .
lb·
·cu 'd.
Lump

•

• tndicates an ltem··with a dbe commitment change with a non-zero goal.
- Indicates a dbe commitment chan e with a zero cal.

UNIT
PRIC E

AMOUNT .
i NCREASE/DECREASE

$364.5

$3.~45.3

$7,684.5~

TOTA L NET CHANGES (DoITar) =

$7,684.sg

I

$13,039:6§

RESIDENT ENGINEEf{Check One)
rcsentatlve:

horlze~ Representative:

Rc~omm~ndcd for ApproVa!

tf-:<:
----

TiUe:._~
<~~""·~:1...
,k_~C",>r-1-<l....
,Date:

>"f1 q { 07_

·

pate:
Date:

P~OJECT MANAGER
· Region Contracts_Spoclallst:

DI.STRICT ENGINEER

. REG. DIRECTOR/PROJECT MANA.GER

{\-pprove(j Spcciflc:aUon Change
(Stewardship)

7 -f). · 07
Dale:

APPROVED FOR UDOT
>$25,000

Recomm end Specification Change
for Approval
(Non-Stewardship)
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ATTACHMENT A
TO CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT CHANGE ORDER NO. 3
PROJECT NUMBER: STP-1544(1)5
"LOCATION: ARCADIA ROAD:
LETTER OF EXPLANATION

REASONS FOR-CHANGE ORDER:
The roadway to the North of app~oach slab #2 is constructed. an an unstable historic land slide. The projec:t
design undertoof{ measures· to· ·Improve i~ ~tability per G~CJtechn.ical Engineer~ r~commedatic>ns. Durh1g
the one year monitoring of the roacfway excavatior.t and embankm~nt, the project G~otechnical En·gil'.lee(_believ~s.
tfl:e olp lari~ slide may still be.moving_. The corrective a.c~lon und~rtook by the project d~igner

wm

take some time to stabjlii~ the sltde. The Structurat Desiijner has developed a modification to the approach
slab that will functlon as· a moviable joint that will allow visual' monitoring of'lhe 3-inch glanded joint.

The joint wiU allow movement f;i the earth towards the concrete bridge stn,Jcture without lnd_uclng l_r1tte_ral
loads-on the structure, while providing for visual lnsp~ction 9f pote.ntial movement as the joint clos:es.

PROJECT ENGINEER'S CC>$T ANALYSIS:·

The Engineers independent cosla~alysis for changes proposed under this Change.Order amountect·to $14,49J.00,
See attach~d ~ngineers E~timate dated 1/18/07

CONTRACT TIME A_DJUSTMENT:
TJi~ ·Engineer h~s r~viewed the Contractor CPM schedule arid finds the add~d work will hnpact the original
work"plan. Based. on the Engineers analysis, Si additional Working Days are jt..t$Ufied to complete forming,

placing added°'reJnforcing steel, ~cbeduling the unique joint and void f9rrn deliver1¢5 ~nd concr~t~ placemen~

COORDINATED. WtTH:
Duchesne County Public Works·

Duc:h~sne_ Coun~y Commission
UDOT Structures Division
UDOT Project Manager
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November 25. 2008
Mr~ Cameron Erickson. Project Man~gor
Build. Inc.
51 QO West .700 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84 104_
SUBJECT:

\

Project No. STP-.1544(1)5

Duchesne County Arcadia Road
Earthwork Claim Settlement
Dear Mr. Cameron:
This letter acknowledges the Claim of Build, Inc. tf1at was elevated to UOOT Region 3 for r.eview

and negotiation in accordance wiU, uoors escalation policy. Two negotiation meetings were held
with UOOT Region .3 Construction Staff. Duchesne County, Horrocks Engineers and Build. Inc. on
October 7" and 281'\of this year. Consideration ol the evolution of this claim. its late deveropmen.1
after the projec;t work was compieted and cqmptiance wit_h conu-act pl?!'\S and specifications hava
resulted in an oppqriunity fot a fa,r and equitable settlement.
A cnanged condition is acknowledged as the basis of the claim, in that 13.512 cubic yards of
surplus roadyray excavation couJd no longer ba effectively disposed of within the contract limits.

BuildTs _most fesent claim totals to an amount of 5389,593.81 as subrnilted at our last meeting of
the 2a••• of October. Psrties recognize that mismanagement oi the Contractor's work contno.uted to
excessive- cost incurred by the BuUd, Inc.
A finding for somcment and rosolutio·n of this claim in its entireiy is hereby pffered to Build. Inc. a$

fotlows:
11

.
Considaratron or payment will be based on the agreed 2,330 hours or trucking un~e as
recorded u1 the Field Engineer"s aia. ry (diary copies attached},•~ lieu of the 2.~94 hours
claimed by Build. lnc., computed at tho claim rate of S110.00,'hbur. See attached
modific·atioo to Build·s claim amounting to an adjusted offer of S211,350.00.

2) Thisproposa1 recogri'izes Build's lack of tm,ely notice of Work beyond origcnal scope and
without n_otice to the Engineer/Owner as required by the Contract Section 00725•. places
liability on B:uildt inc. Because of. tlio lack of nQtice, we Un.d thai Build has sh~re ·

to

some of the responsibility for of employing a more expensive resolution of dispqsing of
the excess excavation ma:enaL Further, Build did not extend the Owne, an opportunity
of concurrence of more economical alternatives. The Owner and its agents have also
incurred direct and overhead costs clue to the late completion of this contract work.

Therefor!. no payment is offered for BuUd's overhead. or prom portions of the claim.
~) lmerest charg_es would only t:>e c:tue. if there was protracted paynlent cf a noh di!;putabie
expense that the Owner had not pafd promptly. This ciarm sattleme,it becomes due
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and payable once approved by all parties. Therefore. to interest payment is offered on
this ctatm.

4) Contract Time will be increased by 25 working days to compensate tot this out.of scope
work aclivity.
5) Roversalof the liquidaied damages amounting to S52.839.50 writ be included in the
settlement
6) A Fuel Cost Adjustment for lhe work beyond previous contract time will be included in
the settfemen~. amounting to S9.283.80. (See attached form C-300)

7) A Bituminou~ Cost Adjustment f9t work beyond previous contract time win be inciuded
in the settlement. amounting. to S34.452.25, (S~e attclchep for c. 302)
s) Item No. 78 wlff be paid based on our copies of re~eived ~eight tickels. Another 419.63··
too of materiai will be included for payment on Estimate No.: 17. The totaf quantity of

payment on this item is 1,171.40 ton. amounting to SS32.799.20.
A revised Paymf;nl Estimate No. t 7 will be compned upon ac9eptance of the above settlemen1
offer~ The attach¢d spread ~fleet summarizes the proposed setUement of .the sut;>jec.l claim in ns
entirety\ and is submitte_d for y9or accept~n~.~ ~s a final and.best offer., Wa reque$t your w.rttren:
deci~ion within te.n (10) days to enable ihs tirnf:ly close out of the projecl within the n~~t 30 days~

Sincerely.
t-J9AR0CKS rGINl;ERS

~~···;.
/, .
.
l V(~.LJJl.~-,.

.

Rex . Harrison. P£
Project Manager
Attachment
PC:
Glen Murphy. Duchesne County Public Works
W.R. .Hamson. D~chesne. t;:ounty Conu1~ssic11. Chairman
Bill Townsend. UOOT Region 3 Prgiect Manager
Bob Wastover. UDOT Region 3 D1stricl Engfrieer
Steve Slade~ BIA. WRO Construction Engineer
Pro1ec1 Fill
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